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Abstract
The relationship between democracy and economic growth has been widely debated
in the social sciences with contrasting results. We apply a meta-analytical framework
surveying 188 studies (2047 models) covering 36 years of research in the field. We also
compare the effect of democracy on growth with the effect of human capital on growth
in a sub-sample of 111 studies (875 models). Our findings suggest that democracy
has a positive and direct effect on economic growth beyond the reach of publication
bias, albeit weaker (about one third) of that of human capital. Further, the growth
effect of democracy appears to be stronger in more recent papers not surveyed in
Doucouliagos & Ulubas¸og˘lu (2008). Finally, we show that the heterogeneity in the
reported results is mainly driven by spatial and temporal differences in the samples,
indicating that the democracy and growth nexus is not homogeneous across world
regions and decades.
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1. Introduction
The relationship between democracy and economic growth has been the subject of
a vast literature in the social sciences with contrasting results. Researchers adopting
a variety of identification strategies, estimation techniques and different samples of
countries and periods have claimed either a positive (e.g. Acemoglu et al., 2019;
Gru¨ndler & Krieger, 2016; Madsen et al., 2015) or a negative (e.g. Przeworski, 2000;
Gerring et al., 2005) or a non-significant relationship (e.g. Baum & Lake, 2003; Murtin
& Wacziarg, 2014).
Early empirical investigations of the institutional determinants of economic growth
(e.g. Barro, 1991; Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 1992) already showed mixed findings. How-
ever, this is not surprising: as Sala-i-Martin (1997) noted, economic growth theories
are usually not explicit in stating which are the factors that matter most for a country
to prosper. Therefore, despite the accumulation of empirical evidence, the consen-
sus among scholars on this issue was far from being reached. As Sirowy & Inkeles
stated “many of the central questions pertaining to the developmental consequences
of political democracy remain, by and large, unresolved”; furthermore, “the relevant
quantitative, cross-national research continues to be plagued by conflicting findings”
(Sirowy & Inkeles, 1990, p. 127). A few years later, similar conclusions were reached
by Przeworski & Limongi: when it comes to the nexus between democratic institutions
and economic development “social scientists know surprisingly little” (Przeworski &
Limongi, 1993, p. 51).
In an effort to solve this puzzle, further attempts moved their focus mostly on
identification strategies, proposing alternative solutions to the embedded endogeneity
of institutions (e.g. Acemoglu et al., 2001). This led to a further diversification of
model specifications, estimation techniques and even measures of democracy. Such
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process led to a tentative consensus for a positive effect of democracy on growth among
economists (Acemoglu et al., 2019). However, despite the democracy and growth
conundrum benefited from renewed attention – and from the introduction of novel
econometric techniques, machine learning algorithms for pattern recognition and new
measures of democracy – the key question remained somehow unaddressed (Gerring
et al., 2005; Knutsen, 2012). Finally, the recent increase in empirical evidence in
economics supporting the causal link from democracy to economic growth is yet
contrasted by a few papers claiming that democracy follows the increase in income
(e.g. Gundlach & Paldam, 2009; Murtin & Wacziarg, 2014).
Doucouliagos & Ulubas¸og˘lu (2008) delved into the debate by performing the first
meta-analysis on the issue based on a sample of 483 point-estimates included in 84
studies. They concluded that “democracy does not have a direct impact on economic
growth. However, it has robust, significant and positive indirect effects through higher
human capital, lower inflation, lower political instability and higher economic free-
dom” (Doucouliagos & Ulubas¸og˘lu, 2008, p. 61). This conclusion supported earlier
evidence provided by Tavares & Wacziarg (2001) and spurred further research (such
as, for instance, Gru¨ndler & Krieger, 2016; Dahlum & Knutsen, 2017; Acemoglu et al.,
2019).
Our contribution to this debate follows Doucouliagos & Ulubas¸og˘lu (2008) and
takes advantage of the increased production of quantitative scientific papers on the
topic as well as advances in meta-analytical techniques. We collect all point estimates
available in both published and unpublished studies and find no evidence of publica-
tion bias in this literature.1 We then address the effect sizes’ hierarchical dependence
(Stevens & Taylor, 2009) – through multilevel modelling and clustering techniques
1Please refer to Table A.1 for a detailed classification of Published and Unpublished works.
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– and assess the robustness of our findings against a variety of specifications and
estimators.
Finally, we collect all point estimates relating to human capital included in our
sample of studies. Human capital is a widely accepted key factor in the process
of economic growth and “a significant amount of research has been devoted to the
education-growth nexus” (Benos & Zotou, 2014, p. 669) in both the neoclassical
and the endogenous growth literature; furthermore, several attempts investigating a
causal mechanism of transmission of democracy on growth focus on human capital
(e.g. Saint-Paul & Verdier, 1993; Tavares & Wacziarg, 2001; Dahlum & Knutsen,
2017). By comparing the strength of the association between democracy and growth
with the magnitude of the effect of human capital on growth, we provide a direct
comparison to support the interpretation of the results of our meta-analysis.2
In brief, the novel contribution of this paper is threefold. First, we collect the
largest and most up-to-date sample of studies investigating the democracy and growth
nexus, consisting of 188 papers and 2047 effect sizes; second, we provide a comparison
between the estimated effect of democracy on economic growth with the effect, on
growth, of human capital; third, we show that the growth effect of democracy appears
to be stronger in more recent papers not surveyed in Doucouliagos & Ulubas¸og˘lu
(2008).
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides a survey of the
main issues in the democracy and growth literature; Section 3 outlines the procedures
followed to collect the sample of studies providing descriptive evidence and discusses
the methodology; Section 4 provides results and findings of both meta-analysis and
2It shall be acknowledged that, while the estimation of the effect of human capital on growth is
comparable with that of democracy on growth, our result can not be interpreted as a meta-analysis
on the education-growth nexus. For the latter, see Benos & Zotou (2014).
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meta-regression analysis as well as predicted values from our preferred specification
of the effect of democracy on growth. Further, it discusses the issue of publication
bias; finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. The democracy and growth conundrum
Despite an initial fierce debate on the role of institutions in determining individual
economic behaviour and aggregate performance, starting in the 1990s, economists
widely acknowledged that “institutions matter” for long-run growth (North, 1994).
Institutions can be defined as “humanly devised constraints that structure po-
litical, economic and social interactions” (North, 1990, p. 97) or as “systems of
established and embedded social rules that structure social interactions” (Hodgson,
2006, p. 13). Therefore, institutions may influence the incentive structure by affect-
ing the underlying economic context, potentially fostering or curbing the dynamics
of economic activity.
Much of the existing empirical literature on this issue implemented the analysis
of the impact of democracy on economic growth through the adoption of indices of
political regimes. Such tradition dates back to the seminal comparative study of
Lipset (1959). Notwithstanding the vast amount of empirical research spurred on
the topic, results were still contrasting and inconclusive.3 One of the main empirical
challenges concerned how to quantify the degree of democracy in a country. Over the
years, several approaches have been proposed: interval-level or dichotomous variables,
both based on experts’ panels, procedural algorithms and, more recently, machine-
3As an example, Przeworski (2000) shows that though the direct relationship is quite inconclusive,
dictatorships tend to allocate capital more efficiently, while democracies (in high-income countries)
produce more output per capita. Studies focusing on levels of democracy (rather than regime
transitions) identified either negative but not significant (Helliwell, 1994) or negative and slightly
significant (Barro, 1996) or inverse-U shaped relationships with low or no statistical significance
(Barro, 2003).
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learning techniques.
The meta-analysis by Doucouliagos & Ulubas¸og˘lu (2008) documented a positive
and significant coefficient of democracy in 27% of the cases, while in 37% it was
positive but not significant and in 36% it was either negative or negative and not
significant (Doucouliagos & Ulubas¸og˘lu, 2008, p. 62). In the same study, the authors
suggested that other factors (e.g. human capital, inflation, political instability, etc.)
possibly act as channels of transmission between democracy and growth.
Przeworski & Limongi (1993) and Knutsen (2011) focused on democratic insti-
tutions as a means to guarantee property rights, while Barro (1991), Przeworski &
Limongi (1993) and Olson (1993) considered the ability of democratic institutions to
assist production and maximise the total output by guaranteeing private activity or
stimulating it by directly supplying inputs. Minier (1998) explored the possibility of
a productivity-enhancing role of democracy, driven by a more efficient allocation of
production factors compared to autocratic regimes. Rodrik & Wacziarg (2005) found
that the process of democratisation exerts a positive effect on growth, whose hetero-
geneity depends on the consolidation of democracy itself. Klomp & de Haan (2009)
stressed that good political institutions are expected to favour growth by limiting
volatility. Gerring et al. (2005) emphasised the role played by political capital, as a
result of the stock of democratic experiences accumulated by a country.
Conversely, other scholars perceived the relationship between development and
political democracy as conflicting or even incompatible: voters’ interest “generally
leads parties to give the expansion of personal consumption a higher priority vis-
a`-vis investment than it would receive in a nondemocratic system.” (Huntington &
Dominguez, 1975, p. 60). Democracy and economic growth are considered to be com-
peting concerns, as Sirowy notes that “successful and rapid economic growth requires
an authoritarian regime” (Sirowy & Inkeles, 1990, p. 129). Further, Olson (1982) pos-
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tulated that in democratic regimes special-interest groups’ actions, aiming at rents,
ultimately lead to an institutional sclerosis of the political and economic system, gen-
erating stagnation and fostering political instability. Following Przeworski & Limongi
(1993), the essential dynamics through which democracy is believed to hamper growth
refer to political pressures for immediate consumption, reducing investments. Fur-
thermore, whereas there is agreement on the benefits of securing property rights,
it is controversial whether autocracies can better secure these rights (Przeworski &
Limongi, 1993). Finally, authoritarian regimes can be more effective in timely imple-
menting the kinds of policies reputed necessary to boost growth while “democratic
regimes are largely unable to implement effectively the kinds of policies considered
necessary to facilitate rapid growth” (Sirowy & Inkeles, 1990, p. 129).
The abundance of different and contrasting results about the democracy-growth
nexus can be explained by a number of alternative reasons. Firstly, since democracy
is a multidimensional concept that cannot be directly observed and uniquely quanti-
fied, its definition as well as the measurement of its components (and how they are
aggregated) are crucial in determining the sign and significance of its coefficient(s).
Secondly, studies aimed at testing the causal effect of democracy on growth, are based
on a large set of model specifications and estimation techniques that can affect the
outcome of the analysis (see Gru¨ndler & Krieger, 2016, for a detailed discussion on
both issues.) Overall, the presence of a large number of alternative hypotheses, spec-
ifications and contrasting results allows for applying a meta-analytical framework in
which the effect of these features on the estimated relationship can be controlled and
accounted for.
7
3. The meta-analytic framework
3.1. Procedures
The validity of a meta-analysis highly depends on the search conducted to re-
trieve the articles that form the sample of studies from which inference will be drawn
(Hopewell et al., 2005). Our last search was conducted on April 2019 and involved
a four-step approach. First, we run the query “democracy AND growth” over five
academic databases – Econlit, Jstor, RePEc, ScienceDirect and SSRN.4 We then in-
vestigated nine qualitative literature reviews on the topic of democracy and growth.5
Then, we moved towards a forward snowballing sampling approach. We identified
four among the most cited papers investigating the democracy and growth nexus in
the last four decades (Weede, 1983; Barro, 1996; Acemoglu et al., 2008, 2019) and
searched, through the Google Scholar citation system, for articles quoting them. Fi-
nally, we integrated our sample of papers with those contained in the meta-analysis
by Doucouliagos & Ulubas¸og˘lu (2008).
To be included in our sample, studies must contain a coefficient of democracy and a
measure of its dispersion (typically the t-statistic or the standard error) in a regression
framework where a proxy of economic growth is the dependent variable.6 To compare
the magnitude (and the direction) of the effect of democracy on economic growth
with a meaningful benchmark, we also collected (when available) the coefficient of
4Precisely, we searched for the words “democracy AND growth” as well as “democracy AND
income”. The search was not circumscribed to the article title but covered also its keywords and
abstracts. Importantly, the databases we employed use search algorithms that diversify the search
terms using passive forms, singular, plurals and synonyms of the words used.
5Namely Przeworski & Limongi (1993); Alesina & Perotti (1994); Brunetti (1997); Heo & Tan
(2001); Rivera-Batiz (2002); Gerring et al. (2005); Kong (2007); Hazama (2008); Knutsen (2012).
6Importantly, studies investigating the impact of regime transitions on economic growth are not
included in our sample, since both their aims and methodologies are not comparable to those of the
democracy and growth literature. While the latter try to assess the impact of the level and/or the
presence of democracy on economic growth, the former investigate how regime transitions (usually
the democratisation process) impact the growth trajectory of countries.
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human capital and a measure of its dispersion.
Concerning publication status, Doucouliagos & Ulubas¸og˘lu (2008) choose not to
include working papers and unpublished articles to control for research quality. We
instead agree with Stanley, who argues that “differences in quality, data or methods
do not provide a valid justification for omitting studies” (Stanley, 2001, p. 135):
rather such differences provide the rationale for performing a meta-analysis and a
meta-regression analysis (MRA) in the first place. Thus, potential differences arising
from different publication status can always be investigated in an MRA setting.
To avoid the artificial reduction of the heterogeneity of the collected effect sizes,
we did not discriminate between what authors indicate as their “best specification”
and other models; instead, we collected all available estimates included in each study.
To assess the robustness of our results, we collected information on whether the
coefficient was part of a model considered by the author(s) as a sensitivity analysis,
robustness test, placebo or falsification strategy and/or was included in the Appendix.
We considered everything else as main specifications.
Further, we also included in our sample specifications reporting interaction or
quadratic form terms of the independent variable(s) of interest. We do acknowledge,
as Gunby et al. (2017) show, that in such specifications the estimated coefficients of
democracy (or human capital) might provide biased information about the marginal
effect of democracy (human capital) on economic growth. In fact, in a non-linear
specification such as y = β0 + β1x + β2x
2, the marginal effect ∂y/∂x is equal to β1 +
2 × β2 × x. Similarly, when the specification includes an interaction term so that
y = β0 + β1x+ β2x× z+ β3z, the marginal effect ∂y/∂x is equal to β1 + β2z. However,
it is always possible to exclude these models in a meta-analysis or to control for the
fact that they were collected in a non-linear specification (or in a specification where
they were part of an interaction term) in an MRA through dummy variables.
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We did exclude studies reporting only Granger causality tests, as they usually do
not report, for the same specification, a single estimate of the relationship between
democracy and economic growth, but rather several lags of it. Finally, we investi-
gated only articles written in English, the lingua franca of the international scientific
community, in which data were collected from 1945 onward.
Overall, the process yielded 2047 βdem (democracy) estimates in 188 papers and
875 βhc (human capital) estimates in 111 papers.
7 We then created a reduced sample
to investigate the effect of democratic institution on economic growth when human
capital is accounted for. It contains 111 papers for a total of 764 effect sizes.8 Further
we created two sub-sample based on publication dates, the threshold being December
2005 (the date of the last search performed by Doucouliagos & Ulubas¸og˘lu (2008)
(henceforth DU). The pre-DU sample contains 741 effect sizes clustered around 94
studies, while the post-DU sample shows 1306 effect sizes included in 94 studies.
Finally, to test the sensitivity of our results to authors’ robustness tests, we created a
sample (main specifications sample) including only the main specifications reported
in each article. It includes 180 studies and 1227 effect sizes.
The number of estimates varies widely across studies. In the full sample, it ranges
from 1 to 90 with a mean of 10.89 estimates per study. In 17 cases, studies report
only 1 estimate matching our criteria, while in 9 cases only we collected more than
50 coefficients. The earliest article in our sample was published in 1983 while the
latest in 2019, covering more than 35 years of literature on the topic of democratic
institutions and economic growth. Of such articles, 10 have been published in the
7References and additional information regarding our sample are provided in Appendix A.
8The number of effect sizes diverge from the full sample of human capital estimates as it is
common in the literature to include more than one proxy of human capital (e.g. separate enrolment
ratios for males and females). Therefore, while there are a total of 875 βhc estimates, there are only
764 democracy-related betas.
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80s, 48 in the 90s, 55 from 2000 to 2009 and 75 from 2010 onward. With regard
to publication status, 150 studies are published in an academic journal recognised
either by the RePEc (Research Papers in Economics) database or by the SCImago
Journal & Country Rank portal. 26 are working papers whose series are included
in the RePEc WPS (Working Paper Series) database. Finally, 3 are books (or book
chapters) and 9 papers either do not report any source or their source is recorded
neither in RePEc nor in SCImago.
3.2. Effect sizes and descriptives
The adopted effect size is the partial correlation coefficient, as commonly done in
recent meta-analysis in economics (e.g. Iwasaki & Tokunaga, 2014; Dauvin & Guer-
reiro, 2017; Gunby et al., 2017). It estimates the degree of association between the
dependent variable and the independent variable when the other variables included
in the model are held constant.9 It has the benefit of allowing the comparison and
the synthesis of the collected estimates when different independent variables, with
different scales and definitions, are used.10 The partial correlation coefficient is then
9Seven models do not include independent variables other than the measure of democracy. There-
fore, correlations computed from these models are not partial correlations but rather zero-order
correlations, which might suffer from severe identification problems. Table B.2 and Table B.10 test
the robustness of the findings discussed in Section 4 to the exclusion of these effect sizes. Results are
substantially unchanged. We thank an anonymous reviewer for driving our attention to this issue.
10The partial correlation coefficient is computed as:
rf =
tf√
t2f + df
(1)
where tf is the t statistic of the regression coefficient βf while df is the degrees of freedom (n−p−1)
in which p is the number of regressors and n is the number of observations. Its sample variance is
instead given by:
var(rf ) =
(1− r2f )2
df
(2)
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normalised using the Fisher’s z-score transformation.11
We begin our analysis documenting the distribution of Fisher’s Z scores. Table
1 provides a first outlook to the accumulated evidence on the relationship between
democracy, human capital and growth.12 The majority of the effect sizes recorded
in the full sample are non-significant while about 1/3 are positive and significant.
On the contrary, in the sample of papers including both measures of democracy and
human capital as determinants of growth, the effect of human capital is positive and
significant in 2/5 of the cases, while the effect of democracy is positive in 1/4 of the
cases and negative in almost 1/5 of the cases.
There are no sizeable differences if we consider either main specifications or the
full sample. On the contrary, differences arise once comparing the pre-DU and post-
DU samples. The positive effect sizes increase from 1/4 to 2/5 from the pre-DU to
the post-DU sub-sample. Further, there is a 10 percentage points reduction in the
non-significant estimates after December 2005. Whether these results are due to the
advancement in econometric techniques or to the use of better measures of democracy
cannot be discerned due to limited data availability.13
We now move to the visual investigation of our samples. The forest plot of the
11The Fisher’s z-score transformation is equal to:
z =
1
2
ln
(
1 + rf
1− rf
)
(3)
with a sampling variance of:
var(z) =
1
n− 3 (4)
12The density plots showing the distribution of the t-statistics for both samples can be found in
Appendix C, Figures C.1a and C.1b. Table C.1 shows that the results of Table 1 are robust to the
adoption of the t-statistics.
13Indeed (at least) two new measures of democracy have been released over the last few years,
namely the Support Vector Machine Democracy Index (Gru¨ndler & Krieger, 2016, 2018) and the set
of democracy indicators provided by the V-Dem project (see https://www.v-dem.net/), but their
use, although rapidly increasing, is still limited in the literature to allow for a further investigation.
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Table 1: Democracy, human capital, and growth: Fisher’s Z score
Positive Negative Non-significant Total
Democracy
effect sizes 711 242 1094 2047
34.73% 11.82% 53.44%
studies 48 20 120 188
25.53% 10.64% 63.83%
Human Capital
effect sizes 352 29 494 875
40.23% 3.31% 56.46%
studies 39 2 70 111
35.14% 1.80% 63.06%
Democracy (Reduced)
effect sizes 197 152 415 764
25.79% 19.90% 54.32%
studies 21 14 76 111
18.92% 12.61% 68.47%
Democracy (Main specifications)
effect sizes 393 157 677 1227
32.03% 12.80% 55.18%
studies 47 20 113 180
26.11% 11.11% 62.78%
Democracy (Pre-DU)
effect sizes 181 114 446 741
24.43% 15.38% 60.19%
study 21 8 65 94
22.34% 8.51% 69.15%
Democracy (Post-DU)
effect sizes 530 128 648 1306
40.58% 9.80% 49.62%
studies 27 12 55 94
28.72% 12.77% 58.51%
Notes: The significance level is p < 0.05. The Reduced sample contains only
estimates of democracy collected from a specification in which a proxy of human
capital was included. The pre-DU sample contains only estimates collected from
studies published before December 2005 - the date in which the search for studies
by Doucouliagos & Ulubas¸og˘lu (2008) ended. The post-DU sample contains
instead only estimates collected from studies published after December 2005. The
main specifications sample contains only estimates collected from specifications
included in the body of the article (i.e. appendixes are excluded) and not labelled
as robustness tests, sensitivity analyses or falsification and/or placebo strategies.
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Figure 1: Forest plots: average effect size (Fisher’s Z) per study and 95% confidence interval.
−1.5 −1 −0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5
Fisher's Z [95% CI]
(a) Democracy and economic growth
−1.5 −1 −0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5
Fisher's Z [95% CI]
(b) Human capital and economic growth
Note: in Figure 1a, axis are limited to the [−1.5/1.5] interval.
relationship between democracy and economic growth (Figure 1a) shows that most of
the studies report (on average) null effect-sizes (not significantly different from 0); it
is interesting to note how the strictly positive effects and the strictly negative effects
almost counterbalance. Instead, the collected effect sizes of the impact of human
capital on growth (Figure 1b) exhibit a rather different pattern. The majority of them
cross the line of null effect similarly to the democracy-growth estimates; however, their
distribution appears to be more skewed towards the positive region of the plot.
These preliminary findings are corroborated by the analysis of the kernel density
estimates of the relationship between democracy and growth and human capital and
growth (Figure 2a). The peak of the distribution of human capital and growth lies,
similarly to that of democracy and growth, in the positive area of the plot. However,
the former shows a much higher density of positive effect sizes.
Finally, Figure 2b shows the kernel density estimates of the democracy and growth
effect sizes based on the full sample (2047 observations) and the reduced sample (764
14
Figure 2: K-density plots: comparison of different samples
(a) Democracy, human capital and economic growth: ker-
nel density comparison
(b) Democracy and economic growth: kernel density com-
parison between the full sample and the reduced sample
estimates). Overall, the full sample shows a higher kurtosis and a peak just right of
the line of the null effect. Conversely, the limited sample exhibits a lower kurtosis
and a peak around the zero.
3.3. Models
Meta-analysis models can be divided between fixed effect and random effect(s)
models. The main intuition behind fixed effect models is that the difference in the
effect sizes is given by sampling variation. In other words, if the sample in each
primary analysis converges towards infinity, each study will document the same effect
size. Analytically, being i = 1, . . . , n the effect sizes in the meta-analytic sample, the
fixed effect model can be written as:
yi = θ + εi, εi ∼ N(0, v2i ) (5)
where yi is the effect size measure (the Fisher’s Z score in our case), θ is the
underlying (true) effect and εi is the error term that is assumed to be normally
distributed with mean 0 and variance v2i – the (above mentioned) sampling variance.
Such a model is then usually fitted by weighted least square with weights wi equal to
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1/v2i .
The choice between the fixed and random effect(s) models should not be based
on the estimated heterogeneity (or the lack of thereof) of the sample as sometimes
assumed, but rather on the inference required by the model itself (Hedges & Vevea,
1998; Borenstein et al., 2010; Viechtbauer, 2010). When the interest lies in summaris-
ing the results of the i effect sizes included in the sample (i.e. restricted inference)
fixed effect models are to be preferred. This can be particularly useful in the analy-
sis of sub-samples, such as our sample of human capital coefficients or the pre- and
post-DU samples, where the sample of i effect sizes is, by construction, not random
with respect to study characteristics.
In contrast, random effect(s) models are recommended when the interest lies in
drawing more general conclusions regarding an empirical relationship not restricted to
the i effect sizes included in the meta-analysis (i.e. unrestricted inference). However,
unrestricted inference rests on the assumption that the effect sizes included in the
meta-analysis are a random sample of all the effect sizes available or, in other words,
that the selected studies are a random sample of the population of studies on the
topic.14
Analytically, with i = 1, . . . , n being the effect sizes in the sample, the random
effect model is given by:
yi = θ + ηi + εi, ηi ∼ N(0, τ 2), εi ∼ N(0, v2i ) (6)
14The random sampling assumption plays a crucial role. If the sample of studies is not random
with respect to study characteristics – e.g. a sub-sample based on the publication date, which is
highly correlated, for example, with estimation techniques and time-span investigated – random
effects model might be biased. In these cases, a better inference can be obtained by adopting fixed
effect models.
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where yi is the effect size measure; θ is the underlying true effect; ηi is the random
effect introduced to model the variability among true effects and its variance (τ 2)
indicates the amount of heterogeneity among them; and εi is the variance component
that is assumed to be normally distributed with mean 0 and variance v2i (the sampling
variance).
Random effect models are estimated using an iterative procedure. First, the het-
erogeneity τ 2 is estimated through one of the (many) estimators proposed in the
literature.15 Then θ is estimated through weighted least square with weights wi equal
to 1/(v2i + τ
2).
Equations 5 and 6 implicitly assume that the effect sizes are independent from
each other. However, this assumption is unlikely to hold when studies contain mul-
tiple effect sizes, an issue sometimes known as “hierarchical dependence” (Stevens &
Taylor, 2009). Both the random and fixed effect model can accommodate for such
a hierarchical data-structure via clustered standard errors, which however assumes
within-cluster homogeneity. Hierarchical dependence can also be addressed through
multilevel modelling, which allows to model without restrictive assumptions both the
within-study and the between-studies heterogeneity and to measure them.16
Assuming i = 1, . . . , n effect sizes and j = 1, . . . , k studies, the multilevel (random
15Among the available estimators, our choice falls on the restricted maximum likelihood estimator,
which “strikes a good balance between unbiasedness and efficiency” (Viechtbauer, 2005, p. 291).
16The I2 statistic (Higgins et al., 2003) measures the between-studies consistency in a meta-
analysis as:
I2 =
(
Q− df
Q
)
× 100
where Q is the Cochran’s Q of the model (i.e. its χ2 statistics) and df are the degrees of freedom.
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effects) model can be written as:
yij = θ + λj + ηij + εij
λj ∼ N(0, σ2B), ηij ∼ N(0, σ2W ), εij ∼ N(0, v2ij)
(7)
where θ is the average true outcome; λj is the random effect that allows for
heterogeneity between studies and σ2B the corresponding between-studies variance;
ηij is the random effect that allows for heterogeneity within studies and σ
2
W is the
between-observations within-study variance; and εij is the sampling error and v
2
ij its
variance.
3.3.1. Meta-regression analysis
Meta-regression analysis involves the regression of the observed effect sizes on one
or multiple study characteristics. It can be used to address what Stanley & Jarrell
call the “problem of specification”: the fact that different specifications, data-sets
and statistical methods make it difficult to achieve consensus on a topic (Stanley &
Jarrell, 1989; Stanley, 2001).
All models shown in Section 3.3 can be easily adapted to include covariates to
investigate the determinants behind the between- and within-study heterogeneity. As
an example, it is possible to add q predictors at the third level (the between-studies
level) of the hierarchical (random effects) model and rewrite equation 7 as:
yij = θ0 + θ1X1ij + . . .+ θqXqij + λj + ηij + εij
λj ∼ N(0, σ2R), ηij ∼ N(0, σ2W ), εij ∼ N(0, v2ij)
(8)
whereX1ij, . . . , Xqij are study-level predictors and θ1, . . . , θq their coefficients. The
variance of λj is now written as σ
2
R, since it indicates the residual between-studies
variance (Konstantopoulos, 2011).
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Recently, Stanley & Doucouliagos (2015, 2017) challenged the conventional meta
(regression) models – fixed and random effect(s) – by proposing a third alternative:
the unconditional weighted least square meta-regression analysis (henceforth UWLS-
MRA). Conventional meta-analytic models assume that the sampling variances are
known. Conversely, the UWLS-MRA assumes that the sampling variances are known
only up to a proportionality constant σ2e , which is “automatically estimated by the
mean squared error, MSE” (Stanley & Doucouliagos, 2017, p.22).
17 Assuming again
q predictors to explain between-studies difference, the UWLS-MRA can be written
as:
yi = θ0 + θ1X1i + . . .+ θqXqi + εi, εi ∼ N(0, σ2ev2i ) (9)
where X1i, . . . , Xqi are study-level predictors and θ1, . . . , θq their coefficients. The
model is then fitted via weighted least squares with weights wi equal to 1/(σ
2
ev
2
i ).
Therefore, while in random effect(s) meta-analysis unrestricted inferences is obtained
through an additive factor (i.e. τ 2), the UWLS-MRA addresses excess heterogeneity
via a multiplicative factor. There is little or no rationale for such a multiplicative
factor.18 However, the simulations reported by Stanley & Doucouliagos (2015, 2017)
show that there is little difference between random effects models and the UWLS-
MRA, which appears to be even superior when there is a sizeable publication bias. We
will therefore present, for the meta-regression analysis, also the results of Equation 9.
As with the random and fixed effect model, to account for the hierarchical dependence
in our data, we will cluster the standard errors at study level.19
17Standard meta-analytic models instead suppose that σ2e = 1.
18“[T]he idea that the variance of the estimated effect within each study should be multiplied by
some constant has little intuitive appeal, [. . . ] we do not recommend them in practice”(Thompson
& Sharp, 1999, p. 2705).
19It is not clear whether Equation 9 can account for the effect sizes’ hierarchical dependence in a
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4. Results
4.1. Meta-Analysis
The findings of our meta-analysis are summarised in Table 2. Alternative meta-
analytic estimators are presented across columns while alternative samples are re-
ported across rows. Standard errors, in parentheses, are shown below coefficients.
The first row provides the estimated effect of democracy on economic growth in
the full sample: it is positive and strongly significant (p < 0.01) in all meta-analytic
models. Both total and between-studies heterogeneity (I2) display large values, thus
supporting the appropriateness of a MRA (see Section 4.2).20
Table 2: Meta-analysis, full sample
RE ML FE RE Total I2ˆ ICC Studies
(s.e.) (clustered s.e.) (clustered s.e.) [Between I2ˆ] [Effect sizes]
Democracy 0.0440** 0.0338*** 0.0464** 97.96% 0.892 188
(0.0138) (0.0041) (0.0152) [87.34%] [2047]
Human capital 0.1348*** 0.0750*** 0.1183*** 90.62% 0.798 111
(0.0156) (0.0134) (0.0126) [72.33%] [875]
Democracy 0.0151 0.0203 0.0127 92.35% 0.718 111
(Reduced sample) (0.0166) (0.0168) (0.0169) [66.31%] [764]
Democracy 0.0430** 0.0363*** 0.0494*** 96.93% 0.821 180
(Main specifications) (0.0141) (0.0055) (0.0131) [79.6%] [1227]
Notes: Standard errors in round parentheses, as indicated in columns’ headers.
Significance levels *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05
Results are substantially unaffected when the sample includes only main speci-
fications, as shown in the fourth row of Table 2. The growth impact of democracy
remains positive and significant (p < 0.01). Overall, our findings show that there is a
multilevel setting. Stanley & Doucouliagos (2017) suggest that meta-regressions can adopt multilevel
methods to account for the fact that “estimates within the same study are likely to be dependent
on each other”. However, applying the unconditional weighted least square method to a multilevel
model implies adopting additive and multiplicative variance components simultaneously. Such a
possibility does not have any theoretical rationale and, to the best of our knowledge, has not yet
been either discussed or tested.
20In Appendix B we present the results of Table 2 after excluding non-linear specifications (Table
B.1). Results hold.
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direct effect of democracy on economic growth, supporting the claim that “democracy
does cause growth” (Acemoglu et al., 2019).
The second row reports, as a comparison, the estimated growth effect of human
capital. There is indeed a shared consensus (e.g. Barro, 2001; Cohen & Soto, 2007;
Ciccone & Papaioannou, 2009) that human capital is positively linked to economic
growth. Our analysis shows that human capital has a sizeable and statistically signif-
icant impact on economic growth and its magnitude is two to three times larger than
the impact of democracy on growth once the effect of human capital is accounted
for. However, it is important to acknowledge that these results should not be taken
as a meta-analytical estimate of the direct effect of human capital on growth. Our
sample contains only estimates of human capital at constant levels of democracy and
does not aim at representing of the whole population of studies on human capital
and growth. In a meta-analysis on the topic based on a rather different set of papers,
Benos & Zotou show that there appears to be a substantial publication bias toward
positive growth effects of human capital and “the growth impact of education after
taking into account publication bias hinges upon the specific features of each study”
(Benos & Zotou, 2014, p. 687).
In the third row, we consider only those models in which Fisher’s Z scores of the
partial correlation between democracy and growth are at constant levels of human
capital (Reduced sample). All three estimation techniques show that the effect of
democracy on economic growth is now not significant. Human capital and democracy
are most likely highly correlated. While part of the literature (Tavares & Wacziarg,
2001) claims that the effect of democracy is mostly channelled through human capital
(a claim confirmed by Doucouliagos & Ulubas¸og˘lu, 2008), from our analysis we cannot
exclude that the effect goes in the opposite direction: democracy might be a channel
for the effect of education on growth.
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Table 3: Meta-Analysis: A comparison before and after Doucouliagos & Ulubas¸og˘lu (2008)
Pre-DU Post-DU
FE FE
(clustered s.e.) (clustered s.e.)
Democracy
0.0287 0.0343 ∗ ∗∗
(0.0202) (0.0042)
Studies 94 94
Eff. Sizes 741 1306
Notes: Fixed effect models (equation 5). Clustered standard errors in
parentheses. The pre-DU sample contains only estimates collected from
studies published before December 2005 - the date in which the search
for studies by Doucouliagos & Ulubas¸og˘lu (2008) ended. The post-DU
sample contains instead only estimates collected from studies published
after December 2005.
Significance levels *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05
Finally, in Table 3 we show the differences between the sub-sample of studies
that have been published before (pre-DU) and after (post-DU) the meta-analysis by
Doucouliagos & Ulubas¸og˘lu (2008).21
Results show that studies published before December 2005 failed to find a direct
growth effect of democracy. Also (Doucouliagos & Ulubas¸og˘lu, 2008) does not find
any direct effect of democracy on economic growth. However, the picture changes
after 2005: newer studies show that democracy has a positive effect on growth.
4.2. Meta-Regression Analysis
Table 4 provides a description of all the potential sources of heterogeneity in-
vestigated in the MRA.22 We account for the high values of I2 found in Table 2
by considering: the different data structure underlying each model specification; the
21These sub-samples are obtained through a non-random pattern in the selection of studies. There-
fore, unrestricted inference (i.e. random effect models) can not be applied, since its underlying
assumptions are violated (see Section 3).
22It is worth noticing that the total heterogeneity is substantially large and in line with the levels
found in many other meta-analyses (see Ioannidis et al., 2017).
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estimation strategies and research designs adopted by the scholars in the field; the
extent of non-linearities in the modelling of democracy; the different proxies chosen
for both democracy and economic growth; the (several) control variables adopted;
the geographical and time composition of the sample(s) of countries.
Table 4: Description of meta-regression variables
Variable name Variable description
Data structure
Panel = 1 if the model uses panel data (yearly observations). Omitted reference
category
Cross-section = 1 if the model uses cross-sectional data
Time-series = 1 if the model adopts time-series analysis techniques
Panel (avg) = 1 if the model uses panel data averaging observations within regular sub-
periods
Estimation techniques
OLS = 1 if coefficients are estimated through Ordinary Least Square. Omitted
reference category
FE = 1 if the model controls for unaccounted time-invariant variables
DPD = 1 if the model is estimated through dynamic panel data (DPD) model
Other techniques= 1 if the model is estimated through estimation techniques not listed above
Non-linear specifications
Non-linearity = 1 if the specification includes a quadratic term of democracy
Interaction = 1 if democracy is also included in an interaction term
Multiple = 1 if the specification includes more than one proxy of democracy
Dependent variable
Level = 1 if the dependent variable is expressed in levels of GDP/GNP and no
lagged value of the dependent variable is included in the right-hand side
Democracy
FH = 1 if Freedom House is the proxy of democracy. Omitted reference category
Polity = 1 if Polity Index is the proxy of democracy
Dichotomous = 1 if a dichotomous variable is the proxy of democracy
Other proxies = 1 if none of the above is a proxy of democracy
Control variables
Convergence = 1 if the specification includes a proxy for convergence
Investment = 1 if the specification includes a proxy for investment a/o physical capital
Govern size = 1 if the specification includes a proxy for government size
Human capital = 1 if the specification includes a proxy for human capital
Corruption = 1 if the specification includes a proxy for corruption
Ethnicity = 1 if the specification includes a proxy for ethnicity
Religion = 1 if the specification includes a proxy for religion
Econ freedom = 1 if the specification includes a proxy for economic freedom
Rule of law = 1 if the specification includes a proxy for rule of law a/o property rights
State capacity = 1 if the specification includes a proxy for state capacity
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Table 4 continued from previous page
Variable name Variable description
Openness = 1 if the specification includes a proxy for financial and economic openness
Population = 1 if the specification includes a proxy for population growth and/or level
World regions
Africa = 1 if the sample includes at least two countries from Sub-Saharan Africa
East Asia = 1 if the sample includes at least two countries from East Asia
East Europe = 1 if the sample includes at least two countries from East Europe
Latin America = 1 if the sample includes at least two countries from Latin America
Middle East = 1 if the sample includes at least two countries from Middle East and
North Africa
South Asia = 1 if the sample includes at least two countries from South Asia
High-income = 1 if the sample includes at least two countries from high-income countries
Region dummies = 1 if the study includes regional dummies
Time periods
1940s = 1 if at least one observations is dated 1940-1949
1950s = 1 if at least one observations is dated 1950-1959
1960s = 1 if at least one observations is dated 1960-1969
1970s = 1 if at least one observations is dated 1970-1979
1980s = 1 if at least one observations is dated 1980-1989
1990s = 1 if at least one observations is dated 1990-1999
2000s = 1 if at least one observations is dated 2000-2009
2010s = 1 if at least one observations is dated 2010-2017
Table 5 presents the main results of our MRA.23 It compares the estimated effect
of each covariate on the relationship between democracy and growth according to
the four alternative estimators detailed in Section 3.3. During the discussion of our
findings, we will mainly focus on the results obtained in our preferred model, the
multilevel (random effects) model (RE ML). Importantly, the other models considered
show no case of conflicting results.
23In Appendix B we test the robustness of our MRA by: testing multicollinearity issues by
estimating each set of covariates separately (Table B.3); adopting raw partial correlations as effect
sizes (Table B.4); including only effect sizes collected from main specifications (Table B.5); including
a set of additional control variables accounting for publication-quality and other publication-related
characteristics (tables B.6 and B.7). Results are unchanged.
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Table 5: Meta-regression, full sample, alternative estimators
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RE ML FE UWLS RE Studies
(s.e.) (clus. s.e.) (clus. s.e.) (clus. s.e.) [Eff. sizes]
Data structure
Cross-section 0.0413 0.0448 0.0448 0.0470 81
(0.0217) (0.0287) (0.0256) (0.0314) [603]
Time-series 0.1168 0.2961 0.2961 0.4220∗ 11
(0.0697) (0.3073) (0.2743) (0.1887) [100]
Panel (avg) 0.0299 ∗ ∗ 0.0166 0.0166 0.0456∗ 63
(0.0106) (0.0155) (0.0138) (0.0227) [663]
Estimation techniques
FE −0.0171 −0.0125 −0.0125 −0.0488 67
(0.0137) (0.0166) (0.0148) (0.031) [777]
DPD 0.0038 −0.0331 −0.0331 −0.1026∗ 20
(0.0175) (0.0229) (0.0205) (0.0435) [233]
Other techniques −0.0027 0.0114 0.0114 −0.0195 54
(0.0143) (0.0203) (0.0181) (0.031) [370]
Non-linear specifications
Non-linearity −0.0864 ∗ ∗∗ −0.0275 −0.0275 −0.0959 ∗ ∗ 25
(0.0163) (0.0214) (0.0191) (0.0362) [248]
Interaction −0.0120 −0.0023 −0.0023 −0.0024 40
(0.0090) (0.0089) (0.0079) (0.0218) [403]
Multiple −0.1061 ∗ ∗∗ −0.0302 −0.0302 −0.0371 10
(0.0313) (0.0226) (0.0202) (0.0317) [68]
Dependent variable
Level 0.0384 −0.0297 −0.0297 −0.0275 13
(0.0255) (0.0236) (0.0211) (0.0797) [54]
Democracy
Polity 0.0010 −0.0103 −0.0103 −0.0129 80
(0.0086) (0.0127) (0.0113) (0.0183) [771]
Dichotomous −0.0156 0.0023 0.0023 0.0232 39
(0.0109) (0.0112) (0.0100) (0.0221) [361]
Other proxies 0.0003 −0.0137 −0.0137 0.0035 28
(0.0084) (0.0096) (0.0085) (0.0237) [323]
Control variables
Convergence 0.0310∗ 0.0043 0.0043 0.0195 152
(0.0123) (0.0142) (0.0127) (0.0302) [1748]
Investment 0.0064 −0.024 −0.0240∗ −0.0576 ∗ ∗ 120
(0.0109) (0.0136) (0.0122) (0.0206) [920]
Govern size 0.0114 0.0024 0.0024 0.0231 69
(0.0104) (0.0113) (0.0101) (0.0216) [550]
Human capital −0.0083 −0.0073 −0.0073 −0.0193 120
(0.0100) (0.0101) (0.0091) (0.0196) [991]
Corruption 0.0164 0.0135 0.0135 0.0273 20
(0.0344) (0.0207) (0.0185) (0.0352) [158]
Ethnicity 0.0006 −0.0248 −0.0248∗ −0.0562∗ 18
Continued on next page
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Table 5 – continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RE ML FE UWLS RE Studies
(s.e.) (clus. s.e.) (clus. s.e.) (clus. s.e.) [Eff. sizes]
(0.0163) (0.013) (0.0116) (0.0257) [122]
Religion −0.0152 0.015 0.0150 0.0783 7
(0.0229) (0.0254) (0.0227) (0.0547) [35]
Econ freedom −0.0180 −0.028 −0.0280∗ −0.0274 26
(0.0172) (0.0146) (0.013) (0.034) [115]
Rule of law −0.0066 −0.022 −0.022 0.0113 26
(0.021) (0.0255) (0.0228) (0.0299) [239]
State capacity 0.0558∗ 0.0424 ∗ ∗ 0.0424 ∗ ∗ 0.0513 3
(0.0220) (0.0146) (0.013) (0.0459) [31]
Openness −0.0079 0.0004 0.0004 0.0273 86
(0.0095) (0.0124) (0.0111) (0.0213) [902]
Population −0.0239∗ −0.0043 −0.0043 −0.0098 79
(0.0104) (0.0115) (0.0102) (0.0204) [849]
World regions
Africa 0.1757 ∗ ∗∗ 0.0755 0.0755∗ 0.1742∗ 161
(0.0148) (0.0414) (0.037) (0.0814) [1773]
East Asia −0.0289 0.0283 0.0283 0.0783 150
(0.0431) (0.0787) (0.0702) (0.1033) [1657]
East Europe 0.0148 −0.0096 −0.0096 0.0267 125
(0.0187) (0.0189) (0.0169) (0.0333) [1388]
Latin America −0.0120 0.0093 0.0093 0.0467 152
(0.0193) (0.0249) (0.0222) (0.0492) [1682]
Middle East 0.0310 0.0189 0.0189 0.0296 155
(0.0182) (0.0214) (0.0191) (0.0499) [1561]
South Asia −0.1117 ∗ ∗ −0.0699 −0.0699 −0.2547 ∗ ∗ 146
(0.0412) (0.0823) (0.0735) (0.0942) [1642]
High-income 0.0241∗ −0.0082 −0.0082 0.003 129
(0.0094) (0.0104) (0.0093) (0.0217) [1299]
Region dummies −0.0062 0.0076 0.0076 0.0177 33
(0.0102) (0.0066) (0.0059) (0.02) [211]
Time periods
1940s 0.0382 −0.0581∗ −0.0581∗ −0.225 3
(0.033) (0.0284) (0.0254) (0.1598) [34]
1950s −0.0050 0.0193∗ 0.0193∗ 0.0525 16
(0.0206) (0.0096) (0.0085) (0.0284) [106]
1960s −0.0605 ∗ ∗∗ −0.0206 −0.0206 −0.0398 95
(0.0148) (0.0142) (0.0127) (0.0251) [990]
1970s −0.0424 ∗ ∗ −0.0356 −0.0356 −0.0193 140
(0.0144) (0.0206) (0.0184) (0.0294) [1525]
1980s 0.0863 ∗ ∗∗ 0.0689∗ 0.0689 ∗ ∗ 0.0655 157
(0.0164) (0.0276) (0.0247) (0.0367) [1763]
1990s 0.0136 0.0177 0.0177 0.0185 108
(0.0187) (0.0216) (0.0193) (0.0266) [1458]
2000s −0.0409∗ −0.0058 −0.0058 −0.0273 70
Continued on next page
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
RE ML FE UWLS RE Studies
(s.e.) (clus. s.e.) (clus. s.e.) (clus. s.e.) [Eff. sizes]
(0.0185) (0.0158) (0.0141) (0.0274) [1019]
2010s 0.0170 0.0408∗ 0.0408 ∗ ∗ 0.1035 ∗ ∗ 22
(0.0383) (0.0171) (0.0152) (0.0395) [281]
Constant term −0.0674 −0.0343 −0.0343 −0.0753 188
(0.0366) (0.0507) (0.0453) (0.0693) [2047]
Notes: Standard errors in round parentheses as indicated in column headers. The sample is
composed by 2047 observations (188 studies).
Significance levels *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05
Data structure. The first block of three rows in Table 5 illustrates that the way
data are structured impacts the estimated growth effect of democracy. Averaging
observations over sub-periods (usually 5 or 10 years) in panel data positively affects
the outcome of the partial correlation. Averaging observations attenuates the effect of
economic cycles, hence capturing longer-term trends. The coefficients of alternative
data structures are not statistically different from 0 when compared to the reference
(omitted) category, which is Panel – panel data with yearly observations.
Estimation techniques. Different estimation techniques do not systematically affect
the partial correlation between democracy and growth when compared with the omit-
ted reference category (OLS). Rather than the estimator per se, the core issue seems
to be related to the modelling of endogeneity, as shown by the robustness checks re-
ported in Table B.8. Here the set of dummies related to the estimation techniques are
replaced with a single dummy identifying whether a specification explicitly models
endogeneity: the coefficient of Endogeneity is positive and significant.24 Overall, our
finding seems to justify the large attention that the literature paid to the endogeneity
of the relationship between democratic institutions and growth (e.g. Lipset, 1959;
24In the case of IV models, the recent literature has shown that IV estimates are often much
higher than OLS estimates (see Jiang, 2017). We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
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Barro, 1999).
Non-linear specifications. The inclusion of a quadratic term of democracy in the
model specification is associated with a downward bias of the effect size. Unfor-
tunately, we can not provide further interpretation of these results as studies do
not report the covariance between the linear and quadratic forms of the proxy of
democracy used. Similarly, including multiple proxies of democracy exerts a signif-
icant negative effect on the estimated effect size.25 This result may simply suggest
a mechanical relation occurring in the estimation procedures, likely driven by the
introduction of collinearity in the model.
Dependent variable. Some scholars adopt levels rather than growth rates to investi-
gate the effect of democracy on economic activity. When there is a lagged value of
the level of economic growth on the right-hand side of the equation it is easy to show
that models using levels produce “identical coefficient estimates and standard errors
for the other explanatory variables as a specification with growth as the dependent
variable and lagged income included as an explanatory variable” (Gunby et al., 2017,
p. 253). However, when the dependent variable is expressed in levels of GDP/GNP
and there is no lagged value of the dependent variable in the right-hand side, the
model is informing about production levels rather than economic growth. Therefore,
we control through the dummy variable Level when effect sizes are collected from
specifications of the latter type. Table 5 shows that this variable is never statistically
significant. Further, our results are robust to the exclusion of these effect sizes (see
Table B.11).
25This features is mostly adopted by earlier studies including in the same model both the Political
Rights Freedom and the Civil Liberties Freedom measures provided by Freedom House.
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Democracy. The definition and measurement of democracy is a key issue in the lit-
erature. Therefore, we carefully collected all the alternative indicators adopted in
our sample of studies. Since the distribution of alternative indicators is uneven, with
some of them that are very popular in the literature and other that are less used, we
distinctly identified only the most frequently used proxies, consistently aggregating
the remaining. According to our MRA, the choice among the most common proxies
of democracy affects neither the strength nor the direction of the estimated effect. To
further investigate these results, we provide an alternative MRA specification includ-
ing a more disaggregated classification of democracy indicators (see Table B.9 in the
Appendix). The only positive statistically significant dummy relates to the Vanhanen
index that has been shown to inflate the growth impact of democracy (Gru¨ndler &
Krieger, 2016). Once we exclude the very small sub-sample of studies relying on this
indicator, in the last column of Table B.9, we find again that the use of alternative
indicators does not impact the estimated growth effect of democracy.
Control variables. The largest block of rows in Table 5 reports the results relating
to most of the control variables that scholars have used over the years to model the
relationship between democracy and growth. The fact that almost all these coeffi-
cients are not significant is one of the main contributions of our analysis: different
specifications of the augmented production function do not matter. Such outcome
is remarkable, considering the extended attention that researchers have dedicated at
growth regressions’ covariates over the last decades. As a partial exception, control-
ling for Convergence positively affects the estimated effect of democracy on growth.
Controlling instead for the growth rate of population decreases the value of the partial
correlation between democracy and growth. Further, introducing a control for State
Capacity – i.e. accounting for state capabilities in extracting rents, controlling their
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territory and providing public goods – increases the likelihood of finding a positive
growth effect of democracy, although this covariate only appears in 3 studies and 31
models.
Geographical characteristics. The set of rows headlined as Geographical characteris-
tics refers to the group of countries included in the primary studies and provides key
insights on the growth effect of democracy: the sample of countries included in the
analysis largely matter in predicting the direction and magnitude of the democracy-
growth nexus. Following the regional classification used by the World Bank, we
discover that democratic institutions have a strong and positive impact on economic
growth in Sub-Saharan Africa (p < 0.001 and the largest coefficient of our MRA)
and a slightly weaker impact (p < 0.05) in High-income countries. If such regions
are included within the samples, scholars are more likely to report the bright side
of democracy. It is likely that in these countries democratic institutions intertwine
with other institutional settings that support total output generation (Barro, 1991;
Przeworski & Limongi, 1993)
The opposite is true for South Asia (p < 0.01, the second-largest coefficient of
Table 5), where democracy has a detrimental effect on growth. In this region, the
theories of Huntington (1968) and Huntington & Dominguez (1975) seem to prevail.
Democracy, through increased demand for current consumption, reduces investment
and hinders growth (Alesina et al., 1992; Persson & Tabellini, 2003): here, author-
itarian regimes can overcome such issue and help countries to reach their growth
potential.
Our findings are mostly consistent with the theoretical and empirical literature
on the subject. In South Asia, the lobbying power of some labour and industrial
groups can lead to an inefficient investment allocation in democratic regimes promot-
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ing rent-seeking behaviours and, consequently, economic inefficiencies at the aggregate
level. Against this background, authoritarian political elites can have the autonomy
needed to promote economic growth without being restrained by rent-seekers’ pres-
sures (Krieckhaus, 2006).
Conversely, democracy enhances growth opportunities in Africa, where clien-
telism has historically been regarded as the region’s main political economy feature
(Wantchekon, 2003; Vicente & Wantchekon, 2009) and the first cause behind the
continent economic fragilities (Sandbrook & Barker, 1985). Indeed, authoritarian
regimes, which protect clientelistic interests and are less exposed to whistle-blowers
arising from the civil society, are more likely to allow for corrupted politicians to
plunder economic gains (Krieckhaus, 2006).
Finally, we find that including East Asian countries in the sample is not likely to
affect the estimated relationship between democracy and growth. This is partially in
contrast with the literature focusing on the positive impact of autocratic institutions
on economic growth in East Asia (Krieckhaus, 2006). Accordingly to such literature,
political elites, without the restraints imposed by democratic institutions, can commit
to promoting rapid industrialisation over all other social objectives, hence fostering
GDP growth (Cumings, 1984).
Overall, our results indicate that the strength of the nexus between democracy
and growth is not ubiquitous. The impact of democratic institutions on economic
growth is largely driven by regional-specific aspects, suggesting that, while democratic
institutions are, on average, beneficial for economic growth, the effect depends on the
countries considered in the analysis.
Time periods. The last set of rows reports a further important result of our analysis:
not only space but also time matters. The coefficients of the dichotomous variables in-
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cluded in the bottom panel of Table 5 highlight that the period covered by the studies
does matter for the sign of the relationship between democracy and growth. In partic-
ular, including the 1960s, 1970s or 2000s highly increases the probability of observing
a negative relationship. This result is consistent with the fact that during the 1960s
and part of the 1970s a relevant subset of democratising countries was experiencing
the decolonisation phase. Thus, despite a formal increase in their democracy levels,
they were also experiencing economic turmoils, hence low (or even negative) growth
rates. The 2000s crises, as well the economic booming of autocratic China, drive
instead the negative and significant coefficient of this dummy. Conversely, including
the 1980s largely increases the probability of obtaining a positive relationship. The
gradual stabilisation of the decolonisation processes, and the begin of the downturn
of the Soviet block, could be interpreted as a golden age of the democracy and growth
relationship.
Overall, the finding that the effect of democracy on growth is largely depen-
dent on space and time characteristics of the underlying sample is consistent with the
evidence on control variables: while convergence and population growth proxy the
socio-economic development of a country, state capacity can be considered a measure
of its overall political development. To better gauge the growth effect of democracy,
time and space are essential components of the puzzle.
4.2.1. Predicted values
Based on our main model, reported in column (1) of Table 5, we provide some
insights on the predicted effect of democracy on growth for a set of preferred study’s
characteristics. Predictions are based on our main model by setting equal to 1 only
the value of the covariates we consider within our preferred set of study features.
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Our preferred specifications include panels averaged over sub-periods (panel avg)
estimated through dynamic panel data techniques (DPD). We base our predictions
on the most common measure of democracy within our sample (Polity) and include
as control variables Convergence, Population, State capacity and Human capital. We
separately consider each world region in alternative time spans: all available decades,
all complete decades (1950-2009) and a set of time intervals that exclude earlier
decades. The resulting predictions are shown in Table 6.
Table 6: Democracy and growth, predicted values for selected regions and periods
All regions Africa East Asia East Europe Latin America Middle East South Asia High-income
All periods 0.1212* 0.2039*** -0.0007 0.0430 0.0162 0.0592 -0.0835 0.0523
(0.0558) (0.0582) (0.0719) (0.0626) (0.0607) (0.0606) (0.0721) (0.0583)
1950-2009 0.0660 0.1487*** -0.0559 -0.0122 -0.0390 0.0040 -0.1387* -0.0029
(0.0403) (0.0440) (0.0591) (0.0492) (0.0470) (0.0478) (0.0629) (0.0439)
1960-2009 0.0710 0.1537*** -0.0509 -0.0072 -0.0340 0.0090 -0.1337* 0.0021
(0.0367) (0.0407) (0.0577) (0.0466) (0.0440) (0.0449) (0.0599) (0.0409)
1970-2009 0.1315*** 0.2143*** 0.0096 0.0533 0.0265 0.0695 -0.0732 0.0626
(0.0377) (0.0415) (-0.0583) (0.0474) (0.0448) (0.0457) (0.0605) (0.0417)
1980-2009 0.1739*** 0.2566*** 0.0520 0.0957 0.0689 0.1119* -0.0308 0.1050
0.0354 0.0394 (0.0567) (0.0454) (0.0428) (0.0436) (0.0590) (0.0395)
Notes: Predicted values based on column (1) Tab. 5. The following variables are set equal to 1: Panel (avg), DPD, Polity, Convergence,
Population, State capacity, Human capital. Standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05
This analysis confirms that the effect of democracy on growth is positive and sta-
tistically significant. Yet, the economic significance of such effect is rather small (see
the guidelines for interpreting meta-analytical coefficients proposed by Doucouliagos,
2011, p. 11). The predicted effect is larger when the 1950s and 1960s are excluded
from the sample. The effect of democracy and growth is not homogeneous across
regions nor periods. For analyses including Africa, the strength of the association
between democracy and growth is positive and moderate in size. A positive effect is
also found for the Middle East, albeit only in the most recent time interval (1980-
2009) and smaller in magnitude. Conversely, for analyses including South Asia, the
effect is negative and small when the 1950s and 1960s are also investigated. In the
remaining regions, no coefficient is statistically significant at 5% level. Overall, Table
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6 confirms a very large variability in the predicted values across regions and decades.
Therefore, the overall small effect might be driven by region-specific and time-specific
effects working in opposing directions.
4.3. Publication Bias
Since the seminal contribution of De Long & Lang (1992), publication bias has
been recognised as another threat to empirical economics (Stanley, 2005). When
articles failing to report statistically significant results are kept in the file drawer
(Rosenthal, 1979) or routinely rejected by editors and referees, the distribution of
effect sizes available on a given relationship would be distorted. As a result, meta-
analytical estimates might over- or under-estimate the true effect, which might result
in reporting a statistically significant relationship when there is none.
To address this issue, researchers have developed statistical techniques to iden-
tify and, if necessary, correct, for publication bias (see Rothstein et al., 2006; Stan-
ley, 2008). Among these, the most common tool is the visual inspection of funnel
plots, which show the effect size estimates from individual studies against an inverted
measure of study size or precision (standard errors in Figure 3). In the absence of
publication bias, the graph should resemble an inverted funnel; low-sample studies
would scatter more widely at the bottom, while large-sample studies would converge
towards the true effect.
Yet, the visual investigation of the funnel plot might be subjective (Terrin et al.,
2005) and, as in Figure 3, complex to interpret when the meta-analytical sample is
large. Therefore, to formally investigate funnel plots asymmetry, researchers usually
test H0 : β1 = 0 in a regression of the effect size on a constant term and the standard
error of the effect size (i.e. yi = β0 +β1SEi) where the error structure might be either
additive or multiplicative (Sterne & Egger, 2006). If there is a relationship between
34
Figure 3: Democracy and growth: funnel plot
The outer dashed (dotted) diagonal lines represent the 99% (95%) confidence interval region. The
inner vertical lines represents the 95% confidence interval region of the RE ML estimate of the effect
of democracy on growth (Table 2).
the observed outcomes and the chosen measure of study size or precision, this might
imply asymmetry in the funnel plot. Therefore, when the null hypothesis of the
funnel asymmetry test (FAT) is rejected, the estimates might suffer from publication
bias (Egger et al., 1997; Stanley, 2005). This does not appear to be the case in the
democracy and growth literature. Panel A of Table 7 shows that the null hypothesis
of no publication bias (βˆ1 = 0) is not rejected in all three FAT tests.
Stanley (2008) shows that testing H0 : β0 = 0 can provide information on whether
there exists a genuine empirical effect beyond the reach of selective reporting bias
(Precision Effect Test, PET). Intuitively, the intercept of a regression of the effect
sizes on their standard errors should provide the effect size of a perfect study (with
standard errors equal zero) once the potential publication bias is accounted for. How-
ever, Stanley & Doucouliagos (2014) show that βˆ0, as estimated by the PET test,
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Table 7: Publication bias: tests
(a) Panel A: FAT tests, no additional covariates
RE ML RE UWLS
(s.e.) (clustered s.e.) (clustered s.e.)
FAT-PET FAT-PET FAT-PET
β0 0.0278
+ 0.0230 0.0273***
(0.0174) (0.0177) (0.0061)
β1 0.1851 0.3823 0.3140
(0.1282) (0.4617) (0.3062)
(b) Panel B: PEESE tests
RE ML RE UWLS
(s.e.) (clustered s.e.) (clustered s.e.)
PEESE PEESE PEESE
β0 0.0394** - 0.0321***
(0.0149) - (0.0041)
β1 0.4825 - 2.2063
(0.5762) - (2.328)
(c) Panel C: FAT tests, additional covariates (not reported) as in Table 5
RE ML RE UWLS
(s.e.) (clustered s.e.) (clustered s.e.)
FAT FAT FAT
β0 -0.1067* -0.0724 -0.0661
(0.0427) (0.0964) (0.0600)
β1 0.4077
+ -0.0273 0.3980
(0.2265) (0.6475) (0.4129)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, as indicated in
columns’ headers. The sample is composed by 2047 obser-
vations (188 studies). The first column reports the estimate
of the Random Effects (Multi-Level) estimation (RE ML); the
second column of the Random Effect model (RE); and the
third column of the UWLS estimates.
Significance levels *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05 + 0.10. The latter
is reported as recommended by Stanley (2017).
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tends to under-estimate the true effect. Replacing the effect size’s standard error
with its variance (v2i ) reduces the bias in the intercept, a test known as Precision
Effect Estimate with Standard Error (PEESE). Therefore, when there is evidence
of a genuine effect, PEESE should be used; otherwise, the corrected effect is best
estimated by FAT tests. To choose whether employing the FAT or the PEESE test,
Stanley (2017) recommends testing for H0 : β0 ≤ 0 at the 10% significance level.
The results of the PEESE estimates are reported in Panel B of Table 7. Over-
all, except for the random effect model, the three-steps FAT-PET-PEESE procedure,
which has become the cornerstone of publication bias analysis in economics (see Ali-
naghi & Reed, 2018, for a list of references), shows that there exist a relationship
between democracy and growth over and beyond publication bias. Importantly, the
PEESE estimates are not statistically different from any of the estimates of our meta-
analysis (Table 2).
Finally, Panel C of Table 7 shows that there is no strong evidence of differential
publication bias associated with other moderator variables (our covariates). It repli-
cates the FAT procedure (Table 7, Panel A) with the addition of the same covariates
(not reported) included in the meta-regression analysis (Table 5). Such a model ad-
dresses “possible interaction of funnel plot asymmetry and moderator variables by
simultaneously fitting a meta-regression and a publication bias model” (Stanley &
Doucouliagos, 2014, p. 75) and confirms that there is no prejudice against the null
hypothesis in the democracy and growth literature.26
26When additional covariates are included, the intercept no longer provides information on whether
there exists an effect beyond publication bias. Therefore, the PET-PEESE procedure is not estimated
when additional covariates are included.
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5. Conclusion
The relationship between democracy and economic growth has long been inves-
tigated in the political science and the economic literature both from a theoretical
and empirical perspective. Starting in the early 1990s, regression analysis has been
increasingly applied to the empirical investigations of institutional determinants of
economic growth. The findings of this early literature have been, at best, mixed.
Further attempts moved their focus mostly on identification strategies, proposing al-
ternative solutions to the embedded endogeneity of institutions (e.g. Acemoglu et al.,
2001). This led to a further diversification of model specifications, estimation tech-
niques and measures of democracy. Overall, such process led to increasing evidence of
a positive effect of democracy on growth at least among economists, but a definitive
consensus was far from being reached.
By adopting a meta-analytical framework, we try to shed lights on this relation-
ship. Based on a hierarchical sample of 188 studies containing 2047 observations
(the largest sample of effect sizes dealing with such an issue), our analysis suggests
that democracy positively correlates to economic growth over and beyond publication
bias. We then compare the magnitude with the observed correlation between human
capital and growth in the appropriate sub-sample of studies. Our analysis suggests
the growth effect of democracy is about one-third of the comparable effect of human
capital.
Further, our results also suggest that findings from more recent papers, not sur-
veyed in Doucouliagos & Ulubas¸og˘lu (2008), uncover a stronger democracy-growth
nexus.
Our meta-analyses also document a high degree of between-studies heterogeneity
– in line with analogous applications in the economic literature (see Ioannidis et al.,
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2017) – that we investigated by adopting meta-regression techniques. Effect sizes
are mostly driven by spatial and time differences in the sample, indicating that the
democracy and growth nexus is largely dependent on the world’s regions and periods
considered.
We find that the adoption of alternative measures of democracy does not sub-
stantially affect the outcome of the analysis. Further, most of the control variables
included in the papers to account for potential confounding effects, do not impact
the reported point estimates, except for Population, Convergence and State Capac-
ity. The use of averages in a panel data setting positively impacts the uncovered
growth effect of democracy, while the inclusion of non-linear terms negatively affects
it. Overall, estimation techniques other than OLS do not systematically affect the
outcome of the uncovered relation between democracy and growth.
Finally, predicted values from our preferred specification support our findings: the
effect of democracy on growth, which is small in the full sample, varies across world
regions and time intervals, being larger once periods beyond 1970s are included. In
particular, the predicted effect size is positive and moderate for Africa; negative and
small for South Asia.
Overall, after digging into more than 2000 regressions within almost 200 papers, we
show that democracy does affect growth, even if the effect is small and not ubiquitous
across space and time, thus confirming, at least from an economic perspective, the
famous quote by Winston Churchill, “[m]any forms of Government have been tried
and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy
is perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of
government except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time”.27
27W. Churchill, Speech in the House of Commons (11 November 1947), published in The Official
Report, House of Commons (5th Series), 11 November 1947, vol. 444.
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Appendix A. The meta-sample
Table A.1: The meta-analytical sample: additional information
Study Coefficients Mean Z SD Z Period Countries Includes HC Publication type
Abdelkader (2015) 3 0.3830 0.0306 1972-2013 1 Yes working paper
Abida et al. (2015) 3 -0.1096 0.0000 1980-2012 3 No journal article
Acemoglu et al. (2008) 2 0.0885 0.0123 1960-2000 134 No journal article
Acemoglu et al. (2019) 90 0.0329 0.0173 1960-2010 175 No journal article
Adams & Klobodu (2016) 3 0.0108 0.0928 1970-2011 33 Yes journal article
Adom (2016) 44 0.8592 0.2684 1962-2012 1 No working paper
Aghion et al. (2007) 9 0.0806 0.0688 1980-2000 148 No working paper
Ahmad & Hall (2017) 8 0.0237 0.0301 1984-2007 58 Yes journal article
Aisen & Veiga (2013) 4 -0.0476 0.0526 1960-2004 113 Yes journal article
Albornoz-Crespo & Dutta (2007) 8 -0.0637 0.4098 1960-2000 18 Yes working paper
Alesina & Rodrik (1994) 2 -0.0085 0.0239 1970-1985 41 Yes journal article
Alesina et al. (1996) 1 0.0424 NA 1960-1985 98 Yes working paper
Ali & Crain (2001a) 8 0.0088 0.1158 1975-1994 91 Yes unpubllished
Ali & Crain (2001b) 2 -0.0007 0.0202 1975-1989 91 Yes journal article
Ali (1997) 2 0.0007 0.0202 1975-1990 91 Yes journal article
Ali (2003) 16 -0.0344 0.2358 1975-1994 91 Yes journal article
Almeida & Ferreira (2002) 3 -0.0141 0.0537 1970-1990 138 Yes journal article
Alpalha˜o (2019) 72 0.0350 0.0145 1961-2016 148 No unpubllished
Amir-ud Din & Khan (2017) 10 0.0582 0.3556 1963-2016 1 No journal article
Anticˇ (2004) 2 -0.0197 0.0251 1951-1990 141 Yes journal article
Arfaoui et al. (2016) 2 -0.2305 0.1324 1980-2014 1 No journal article
Assane & Pourgerami (1994) 8 0.0489 0.0349 1980-1989 33 No journal article
Assiotis & Sylwester (2014) 29 0.0808 0.0888 1984-2007 155 No journal article
Assiotis & Sylwester (2015) 37 0.1643 0.1105 1986-2010 118 Yes journal article
Aziz & Ahmad (2018) 12 -0.1941 0.2080 2000-2009 126 Yes working paper
Baklouti & Boujelbene (2015) 1 -0.2966 NA 1998-2011 12 Yes journal article
Baklouti & Boujelbene (2018) 1 -0.4036 NA 1998-2011 12 Yes journal article
Barro & Lee (1993) 2 0.0048 0.2858 1965-1985 89 Yes working paper
Barro (1996) 9 0.2149 0.0755 1965-1990 90 Yes working paper
Barro (1996b) 3 -0.0068 0.1166 1960-1990 84 Yes journal article
Barro (2000) 2 0.1127 0.0078 1965-1995 97 Yes journal article
Bataka (2019) 12 0.2068 0.0390 1980-2015 40 Yes journal article
Baum & Lake (2003) 2 -0.0073 0.0150 1967-1997 128 Yes journal article
Bhalla (1997) 17 0.2971 0.0556 1973-1990 86 Yes book
Bleaney & Nishiyama (2002) 4 0.4405 0.0545 1965-1990 70 Yes journal article
Bluedorn (2001) 4 -0.1210 0.0448 1960-1990 78 Yes journal article
Boko (2002) 2 0.2418 0.0135 1971-1999 20 No journal article
Bornscheir & Scholtz (2002) 5 0.1430 0.1369 1968-1991 102 Yes unpubllished
Bougharriou et al. (2019) 2 0.1224 0.0636 2002-2013 16 No journal article
Brueckner et al. (2018) 11 -0.0225 0.0602 1970-2010 126 Yes working paper
Butkiewicz & Yanikkaya (2006) 52 0.0891 0.0830 1970-1999 114 Yes journal article
Butkiewicz & Yanikkaya (2007) 7 -0.0626 0.0432 1970-1999 106 Yes journal article
Cavallo & Cavallo (2010) 32 -0.0111 0.0435 1970-2004 78 Yes journal article
Chan et al. (2017) 1 -0.0292 NA 1984-2014 113 No journal article
Chatterji (1998) 5 0.2159 0.0326 1960-1985 81 Yes journal article
Chen (2003) 4 0.5358 0.1926 1970-1992 54 Yes journal article
Chen et al. (2019) 6 0.0472 0.0045 1987-2009 147 No unpubllished
Chousa et al. (2006) 1 0.1700 NA 1994-2002 55 No working paper
Collier (1999) 1 0.1834 NA 1960-1990 94 No unpubllished
Collier (2000) 13 0.0950 0.0737 1960-1990 94 Yes journal article
Combes et al. (2019) 15 0.1086 0.0274 1980-2012 70 Yes journal article
Comeau (2003) 11 -0.3143 0.1980 1972-1989 82 Yes journal article
Corujo & Simo˜es (2012) 1 -0.8299 NA 1960-2001 1 Yes journal article
Dasgupta et al. (2013) 2 0.0075 0.0077 1980-2010 1 Yes working paper
Dawson (1998) 2 0.0944 0.0141 1975-1990 85 Yes journal article
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De Haan & Siermann (1995) 13 0.0667 0.1044 1973-1988 96 No journal article
De Haan & Siermann (1996a) 2 0.0351 0.0317 1961-1992 110 No journal article
De Haan & Siermann (1996b) 10 0.1085 0.3463 1963-1988 97 No journal article
De la Croix & Delavallade (2011) 7 -0.0536 0.0159 1994-2004 62 No journal article
De Luca et al. (2015) 2 0.1012 0.0191 1960-2003 129 No journal article
Deana & Gamba (2008) 2 -0.0163 0.0220 1955-2000 183 No working paper
Decker & Lim (2008) 52 0.0346 0.0681 1995-2002 128 No journal article
Dias & Tebaldi (2012) 11 0.0343 0.0175 1965-2005 61 Yes journal article
Diebolt et al. (2013) 5 -0.2835 0.0975 1990-2000 85 No journal article
Doucouliagos & Ulubasoglu (2006) 2 0.0039 0.0450 1970-1999 82 Yes journal article
Drury et al. (2006) 3 -0.0216 0.0293 1982-1997 94 No journal article
Durham (1999) 18 0.0465 0.1087 1960-1989 105 Yes journal article
Emara & Jhonsa (2014) 2 0.4648 0.3566 2009-2009 189 No working paper
Fedderke & Klitgaard (1998) 7 0.0931 0.1817 1960-1985 113 Yes journal article
Feng (1995) 12 0.0966 0.1713 1982-1988 19 No journal article
Feng (1996) 6 0.3731 0.1375 1960-1992 40 Yes journal article
Feng (1997) 5 -0.2225 0.0823 1960-1980 96 Yes journal article
Fidrmuc (2003) 42 0.1045 0.3125 1996-2000 25 Yes journal article
Flachaire et al. (2014) 4 0.0221 0.0756 1975-2005 79 Yes journal article
Fosu (2008) 15 -0.2428 0.1495 1975-2004 30 No journal article
Ganau (2017) 7 -0.0610 0.0258 1981-2001 50 No journal article
Gasiorowski (2000) 3 -0.0768 0.0241 1968-1991 49 Yes journal article
Gerring et al. (2005) 25 0.0738 0.0629 1965-2000 187 Yes journal article
Gerring et al. (2013) 32 0.0120 0.0165 1965-2005 198 No unpubllished
Ghosh et al. (2013) 12 -0.0009 0.1103 1960-2009 15 Yes working paper
Glaeser et al. (2004) 12 0.1140 0.1356 1990-2000 102 Yes journal article
Goldsmith (1995) 2 0.3493 0.0863 1988-1993 59 No journal article
Gounder (2002) 5 0.3085 0.0981 1968-1996 1 No journal article
Green (2018) 6 0.1230 0.0502 1961-2014 45 No journal article
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Gru¨ndler & Krieger (2016) 38 0.0877 0.1094 1981-2011 164 Yes journal article
Gru¨ndler & Krieger (2018) 57 0.0287 0.0107 1960-2014 170 Yes working paper
Gupta (1988) 2 0.1996 0.1172 1950-1977 28 No journal article
Gupta et al. (1998) 1 0.0590 NA 1965-1986 120 Yes journal article
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Jamali et al. (2007) 2 0.1192 0.0568 1990-1999 92 Yes journal article
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Khanna (2017) 6 0.0591 0.0287 1984-2005 19 Yes journal article
Kim & Lee (2016) 20 0.0284 0.0864 1976-2001 154 Yes journal article
Knack & Keefer (1995) 4 0.0515 0.0582 1974-1989 97 No journal article
Knutsen (2013) 45 0.1138 0.0708 1990-2004 153 No journal article
Knutsen et al. (2016) 6 0.0337 0.0168 1960-2014 149 No unpubllished
Korhonen (2004) 15 0.1303 0.1502 1970-2001 106 Yes working paper
Kormendi & Meguire (1985) 2 0.1669 0.1443 1950-1977 47 No journal article
Krieckhaus (2004) 57 -0.0407 0.2323 1990-1999 112 Yes journal article
Krieckhaus (2006) 55 0.0160 0.6179 1980-2000 85 Yes journal article
Kurzman et al. (2002) 4 -0.0700 0.0267 1951-1980 107 Yes journal article
Landau (1986) 20 -0.1244 0.0556 1960-1980 65 Yes journal article
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Leblang (1996) 3 0.1169 0.0287 1960-1990 50 Yes journal article
Leblang (1997) 9 0.1694 0.0443 1970-1989 92 Yes journal article
Leschke (2000) 2 0.2610 0.4955 1997-1997 80 No journal article
Levine & Renelt (1992) 3 0.0282 0.1863 1960-1989 86 Yes journal article
Li & Zou (1998) 10 -0.1310 0.2092 1960-1994 46 Yes journal article
Lopes & de Jesus (2015) 6 0.1297 0.1679 1990-2010 77 Yes journal article
Lundberg & Squire (2003) 1 -0.4103 NA 1960-1992 38 Yes journal article
Ma & Ouyang (2016) 3 0.0323 0.0865 1960-2010 48 Yes journal article
Madsen et al. (2015) 1 0.0942 NA 1950-2000 141 No journal article
Malikane & Chitambara (2017) 4 0.4049 0.1177 1989-2014 8 Yes journal article
Marsh (1988) 6 0.0000 0.1631 1970-1984 47 No journal article
Masaki & Van de Walle (2014) 10 0.0546 0.0233 1982-2012 43 No working paper
Mazurek (2017) 1 -0.7993 NA 2005-2015 32 Yes journal article
Mbaku & Kimenyi (1997) 10 0.4915 0.2005 1950-1985 46 No journal article
Mbaku (1994) 12 0.0597 0.1862 1970-1991 117 No journal article
Mehanna (2006) 2 0.1412 0.0067 1982-1999 80 Yes journal article
Miguel et al. (2004) 1 0.0054 NA 1981-1999 41 No journal article
Minier (1998) 4 0.1661 0.1248 1970-1989 96 Yes journal article
Minier (2003) 4 0.1731 0.1497 1970-1990 73 Yes journal article
Mira & Hammadache (2017) 12 0.0104 0.1136 1996-2001 45 No working paper
Mo (2000) 16 -0.2319 0.0900 1970-1985 83 Yes journal article
Mo (2001) 9 -0.2773 0.0969 1970-1985 46 Yes journal article
Mo (2015) 14 -0.0271 0.1812 1970-1985 105 Yes journal article
Mobarak (2005) 13 -0.0199 0.0933 1960-1990 77 Yes journal article
Murtin & Wacziarg (2014) 3 -0.0043 0.1142 1960-2000 69 No journal article
Nelson & Singh (1998) 6 0.1529 0.0128 1970-1989 67 No journal article
Oliva & Rivera Batiz (2002) 11 0.1851 0.0587 1970-1994 120 Yes journal article
Parada & Garc¸ia (2008) 10 0.1065 0.1507 1984-1999 17 Yes working paper
Perotti (1996) 2 -0.1070 0.0299 1960-1985 67 Yes journal article
Persson & Tabellini (1992) 3 -0.1105 0.2709 1960-1985 50 Yes journal article
Persson & Tabellini (1994) 1 -0.3991 NA 1960-1985 49 Yes journal article
Pettersson (2004) 44 -0.0681 0.0415 1982-2000 129 Yes working paper
Piatek (2016) 1 -0.9284 NA 2007-2010 25 No journal article
Pinho & Madaleno (2009) 15 0.0403 0.0263 1960-2000 170 Yes unpubllished
Pitlik (2002) 4 0.1144 0.0287 1975-1995 73 Yes journal article
Plu¨mper & Martin (2003) 9 0.3313 0.1323 1975-1997 83 Yes journal article
Polterovich & Popov (2007) 2 -0.0336 0.1914 1975-1999 45 No working paper
Pourgerami & Assane (1992) 8 0.4017 0.2595 1950-1977 47 No journal article
Pourgerami (1988) 3 0.4055 0.2351 1965-1984 92 No journal article
Pourgerami (1992) 7 0.0861 0.0872 1958-1986 104 Yes journal article
Quinn & Woolley (2001) 2 0.0736 0.1092 1974-1989 92 Yes journal article
Qureshi & Ahmed (2012) 5 0.0338 0.1497 1987-2002 73 Yes working paper
Rivera-Batiz (2002) 2 0.1794 0.2207 1960-1990 59 Yes journal article
Rodrik (1997) 1 0.0016 NA 1970-1989 90 No working paper
Rodrik (1999) 2 0.2225 0.0108 1960-1989 104 No journal article
Rossignoli (2014) 6 0.0113 0.0197 1961-2010 169 No book
Sakyi & Adams (2012) 4 -0.4147 0.0823 1960-2008 1 No journal article
Salahodjaev (2015) 12 0.2389 0.0983 1990-2013 120 Yes journal article
Sala-i-Martin (1997) 2 0.2546 0.0000 1960-1992 133 No journal article
Scully (1988) 4 0.1222 0.2177 1960-1980 115 No journal article
Siermann (1998) 42 0.0810 0.0864 1973-1992 110 No book
Svensson (1999) 16 -0.0543 0.1492 1970-1989 68 Yes journal article
Sylwester (2015) 16 0.0260 0.0077 1950-2007 180 Yes journal article
Tang & Tang (2018) 77 0.0446 0.0298 1970-2010 112 No journal article
Vorhies & Glahe (1988) 1 0.5340 NA 1986-1986 150 No journal article
Weede (1983) 10 -0.3388 0.1943 1960-1979 94 Yes journal article
Weede (1984) 11 -0.3527 0.1778 1960-1979 75 Yes journal article
Weede (1993) 6 0.0329 0.0737 1987-1987 96 Yes journal article
Weede (1996) 5 -0.0063 0.1594 1980-1987 93 Yes journal article
Weede (1997) 9 -0.1860 0.0677 1960-1985 48 Yes journal article
Williams (2017) 29 0.1014 0.0780 1982-2011 78 No journal article
Williams (2018) 6 0.3292 0.6027 1970-2014 81 No journal article
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Wu & Davis (1999) 6 0.0093 0.0141 1975-1990 92 No journal article
Wu (2012) 18 0.0315 0.0539 1960-2001 111 No journal article
Xi (2017) 2 0.0111 0.0059 1950-2010 167 No journal article
Yanıkkaya & Turan (2019) 9 -0.1052 0.0566 1960-2009 122 Yes journal article
Yanovskiy & Ginker (2017) 5 0.0365 0.0067 1970-2012 124 Yes journal article
Zakaria & Fida (2009) 22 -0.4268 0.1558 1947-2006 1 Yes journal article
Zalle´ (2018) 2 0.0326 0.2471 2000-2015 29 Yes journal article
Zaouali (2014) 4 0.1217 0.1066 2000-2011 40 Yes working paper
Zouhaier & Karim (2012) 2 -0.1647 0.0861 2000-2009 11 No journal article
Notes: Coefficients indicates the number of effect sizes included in the manuscript. Mean Z and
SD Z are, respectively, the mean value of the Fisher’s Z and its standard deviation. SD Z is equal
to NA if only one coefficient is available in the manuscript. Period describes the longest time-span
investigated in the manuscript and Countries the largest sample of countries analyzed. Includes HC
indicates whether in at least one of the specifications collected from the manuscript there is a proxy
of human capital. Publication type is: “journal article” if the manuscript venue is among those
included in the IDEAS/RePEc H-Index journals list; “working paper” if the manuscript venue is
among those included in the IDEAS/RePEc H-Index working papers list; “book” if the manuscript
is a book or a contribution in a book; “unpublished” if neither “journal article” nor “working paper”
nor “book” apply.
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Appendix B. Robustness checks
Table B.1: Meta-analysis, linear specifications only
RE ML FE RE Total I2ˆ ICC Studies
(s.e.) (clustered s.e.) (clustered s.e.) [Between I2ˆ] [Effect sizes]
Democracy 0.0565*** 0.0317*** 0.0453*** 97.85% 0.972 151
(0.0156) (0.0049) (0.0125) [95.15%] [1364]
Human capital 0.1480*** 0.0749*** 0.1277*** 90.98% 0.866 96
( 0.0173) (0.0165) ( 0.0146) [78.82%] [639]
Democracy 0.0237 0.0315 0.0253 93.12% 0.525 86
(Reduced sample) (0.0179) (0.0196) ( 0.0201) [48.87%] [516]
Democracy 0.0539*** 0.0344*** 0.0556*** 96.76% 0.995 144
(Main specifications) (0.0165) (0.0066) (0.0138) [96.23%] [895]
Notes: Standard errors in round parentheses, as indicated in columns’ headers. Model specifications including quadratic or interacted
terms of democracy are excluded from the sample.
Significance levels *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05
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Table B.2: Meta-analysis, excluding zero-order correlations
RE ML FE RE Total I2ˆ ICC Studies
(s.e.) (clustered s.e.) (clustered s.e.) [Between I2ˆ] [Effect sizes]
Democracy
0.0415** 0.0336*** 0.0456** 97.77% 0.883 185
(0.0133) (0.0041) (0.0151) [86.35%] [2040]
Notes: Standard errors in round parentheses, as indicated in columns’ headers. The sample excludes zero-order correlations.
Significance levels *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05
68
T
ab
le
B
.3
:
M
et
a
-r
eg
re
ss
io
n
,
fu
ll
sa
m
p
le
,
in
d
iv
id
u
a
l
b
lo
ck
s
o
f
co
va
ri
a
te
s
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
R
E
M
L
R
E
M
L
R
E
M
L
R
E
M
L
R
E
M
L
R
E
M
L
R
E
M
L
R
E
M
L
S
tu
d
ie
s
(s
.e
.)
(s
.e
.)
(s
.e
.)
(s
.e
.)
(s
.e
.)
(s
.e
.)
(s
.e
.)
(s
.e
.)
[E
ff
.
si
z
e
s]
D
a
ta
st
ru
ct
u
re
C
ro
ss
-s
ec
ti
on
0.
02
47
8
1
(0
.0
17
4)
[6
0
3
]
T
im
e-
se
ri
es
0
.0
41
2
1
1
(0
.0
63
5)
[1
0
0
]
P
an
el
(a
v
g)
0
.0
23
7∗
6
3
(0
.0
10
4)
[6
6
3
]
E
st
im
a
ti
o
n
te
ch
n
iq
u
es
F
E
−0
.0
1
3
9
6
7
(0
.0
1
0
1
)
[7
7
7
]
D
P
D
0.
00
6
5
2
0
(0
.0
1
4
4
)
[2
3
3
]
O
th
er
te
ch
n
iq
u
es
−0
.0
0
1
0
5
4
(0
.0
1
3
2
)
[3
7
0
]
E
n
d
og
en
ei
ty
E
n
d
og
en
ei
ty
0
.0
1
9
4
∗∗
7
1
(0
.0
0
6
9
)
[6
8
8
]
N
o
n
-l
in
ea
r
sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
o
n
s
N
on
-l
in
ea
ri
ty
−0
.0
8
6
2
∗∗
∗
2
5
(0
.0
1
6
4
)
[2
4
8
]
In
te
ra
ct
io
n
−0
.0
1
2
5
4
0
(0
.0
0
8
8
)
[4
0
3
]
M
u
lt
ip
le
−0
.0
7
7
3∗
1
0
(0
.0
3
0
3
)
[6
8
]
D
em
oc
ra
cy
P
ol
it
y
0.
0
0
0
8
8
0
(0
.0
0
8
9
)
[7
7
1
]
D
ic
h
ot
om
ou
s
−0
.0
2
1
7∗
3
9
C
o
n
ti
n
u
ed
o
n
n
ex
t
p
a
g
e
69
T
a
b
le
B
.3
–
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
fr
o
m
p
re
v
io
u
s
p
a
g
e
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
R
E
M
L
R
E
M
L
R
E
M
L
R
E
M
L
R
E
M
L
R
E
M
L
R
E
M
L
R
E
M
L
S
tu
d
ie
s
(s
.e
.)
(s
.e
.)
(s
.e
.)
(s
.e
.)
(s
.e
.)
(s
.e
.)
(s
.e
.)
(s
.e
.)
[E
ff
.
si
z
e
s]
(0
.0
1
0
9
)
[3
6
1
]
O
th
er
p
ro
x
ie
s
0
.0
0
0
7
2
8
(0
.0
0
8
7
)
[3
2
3
]
D
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
a
bl
e
L
ev
el
0
.0
3
5
8
1
3
(0
.0
2
3
5
)
[5
4
]
C
o
n
tr
o
l
va
ri
a
bl
es
C
on
ve
rg
en
ce
0
.0
2
6
9∗
1
5
2
(0
.0
1
1
8
)
[1
7
4
8
]
In
ve
st
m
en
t
0
.0
0
5
4
1
2
0
(0
.0
1
1
0
)
[9
2
0
]
G
ov
er
n
si
ze
0
.0
0
8
2
6
9
(0
.0
1
0
5
)
[5
5
0
]
H
u
m
an
ca
p
it
al
−0
.0
1
2
8
1
2
0
(0
.0
1
0
0
)
[9
9
1
]
C
or
ru
p
ti
on
0
.0
4
6
2
0
(0
.0
3
3
5
)
[1
5
8
]
E
th
n
ic
it
y
0
.0
1
1
5
1
8
(0
.0
1
3
9
)
[1
2
2
]
R
el
ig
io
n
−0
.0
0
6
5
7
(0
.0
2
2
9
)
[3
5
]
E
co
n
fr
ee
d
om
−0
.0
1
0
2
2
6
(0
.0
1
7
2
)
[1
1
5
]
R
u
le
of
la
w
0
.0
0
9
9
2
6
(0
.0
2
1
0
)
[2
3
9
]
S
ta
te
ca
p
ac
it
y
0
.0
1
8
9
3
(0
.0
1
9
7
)
[3
1
]
O
p
en
n
es
s
−0
.0
0
4
8
8
6
(0
.0
0
9
5
)
[9
0
2
]
C
o
n
ti
n
u
ed
o
n
n
ex
t
p
a
g
e
70
T
a
b
le
B
.3
–
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
fr
o
m
p
re
v
io
u
s
p
a
g
e
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
R
E
M
L
R
E
M
L
R
E
M
L
R
E
M
L
R
E
M
L
R
E
M
L
R
E
M
L
R
E
M
L
S
tu
d
ie
s
(s
.e
.)
(s
.e
.)
(s
.e
.)
(s
.e
.)
(s
.e
.)
(s
.e
.)
(s
.e
.)
(s
.e
.)
[E
ff
.
si
z
e
s]
P
op
u
la
ti
on
−0
.0
2
0
6
∗
7
9
(0
.0
1
0
1
)
[8
4
9
]
W
o
rl
d
re
gi
o
n
s
A
fr
ic
a
0.
1
7
3
9
∗∗
∗
1
6
1
(0
.0
1
4
9
)
[1
7
7
3
]
E
as
t
A
si
a
−0
.0
3
6
6
1
5
0
(0
.0
4
2
2
)
[1
6
5
7
]
E
as
t
E
u
ro
p
e
0
.0
1
5
8
1
2
5
(0
.0
1
8
9
)
[1
3
8
8
]
L
at
in
A
m
er
ic
a
−0
.0
0
9
8
1
5
2
(0
.0
1
9
6
)
[1
6
8
2
]
M
id
d
le
E
as
t
0
.0
2
8
9
1
5
5
(0
.0
1
8
5
)
[1
5
6
1
]
S
ou
th
A
si
a
−0
.0
9
9
0∗
1
4
6
(0
.0
4
0
0
)
[1
6
4
2
]
H
ig
h
-i
n
co
m
e
0
.0
2
7
5
∗∗
1
2
9
(0
.0
0
9
5
)
[1
2
9
9
]
R
eg
io
n
d
u
m
m
ie
s
−0
.0
0
1
4
3
3
(0
.0
0
9
1
)
[2
1
1
]
T
im
e
pe
ri
od
s
19
40
s
0
.0
2
6
7
3
(0
.0
3
2
2
)
[3
4
]
19
50
s
−0
.0
1
6
4
1
6
(0
.0
1
9
5
)
[1
0
6
]
19
60
s
−0
.0
5
8
4
∗∗
∗
9
5
(0
.0
1
4
1
)
[9
9
0
]
19
70
s
−0
.0
4
6
5
∗∗
∗
1
4
0
(0
.0
1
3
5
)
[1
5
2
5
]
19
80
s
0
.0
7
6
4
∗∗
∗
1
5
7
C
o
n
ti
n
u
ed
o
n
n
ex
t
p
a
g
e
71
T
a
b
le
B
.3
–
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
fr
o
m
p
re
v
io
u
s
p
a
g
e
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
R
E
M
L
R
E
M
L
R
E
M
L
R
E
M
L
R
E
M
L
R
E
M
L
R
E
M
L
R
E
M
L
S
tu
d
ie
s
(s
.e
.)
(s
.e
.)
(s
.e
.)
(s
.e
.)
(s
.e
.)
(s
.e
.)
(s
.e
.)
(s
.e
.)
[E
ff
.
si
z
e
s]
(0
.0
1
5
2
)
[1
7
6
3
]
19
90
s
0.
0
1
0
2
1
0
8
(0
.0
1
8
0
)
[1
4
5
8
]
20
00
s
−0
.0
5
0
4
∗∗
7
0
(0
.0
1
6
9
)
[1
0
1
9
]
20
10
s
0.
0
2
6
7
2
2
(0
.0
3
7
4
)
[2
8
1
]
C
on
st
an
t
te
rm
0
.0
25
8
0.
04
8
0
∗∗
0.
0
3
8
3
∗∗
0
.0
5
7
7
∗∗
∗
0
.0
4
7
1
∗∗
∗
0
.0
2
7
7
−0
.0
4
3
3
∗
0.
0
5
2
6
∗
1
8
8
(0
.0
16
3)
(0
.0
1
5
0
)
(0
.0
1
4
0
)
(0
.0
1
4
1
)
(0
.0
1
4
3
)
(0
.0
1
8
7
)
(0
.0
2
0
0
)
(0
.0
2
3
1
)
[2
0
4
7
]
N
o
te
s:
R
an
d
om
E
ff
ec
ts
(M
u
lt
iL
ev
el
)
M
R
A
.
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
in
ro
u
n
d
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
.
T
h
e
sa
m
p
le
is
co
m
p
o
se
d
b
y
2
04
7
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
(1
8
8
st
u
d
ie
s)
.
S
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
le
v
el
s
**
*
0.
00
1
**
0.
01
*
0.
0
5
72
Table B.4: Meta-regression, full sample, uncorrected partial correlations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RE ML FE UWLS RE Studies
(s.e.) (clus. s.e.) (clus. s.e.) (clus. s.e.) [Eff. sizes]
Data structure
Cross-section 0.0708 ∗ ∗∗ 0.0874∗ 0.0874∗ 0.0524 81
(0.0213) (0.0390) (0.0348) (0.0314) [603]
Time-series 0.1218 0.4801 ∗ ∗ 0.4801 ∗ ∗ 0.394 ∗ ∗ 11
(0.0717) (0.1729) (0.1543) (0.1278) [100]
Panel (avg) 0.0266∗ 0.0350 0.035 0.0465∗ 63
(0.0108) (0.0239) (0.0213) (0.0228) [663]
Estimation techniques
FE −0.0092 −0.0019 −0.0019 −0.0493 67
(0.0138) (0.0222) (0.0198) (0.0317) [777]
DPD 0.0108 −0.0232 −0.0232 −0.1058∗ 20
(0.0178) (0.0279) (0.0249) (0.0439) [233]
Other techniques 0.0034 0.0194 0.0194 −0.0218 54
(0.0144) (0.0239) (0.0214) (0.0312) [370]
Non-linear specifications
Non-linearity −0.0745 ∗ ∗∗ −0.0661 −0.0661. −0.0957 ∗ ∗ 25
(0.0162) (0.0391) (0.0349) (0.0362) [248]
Interaction −0.0107 0.0023 0.0023 −0.0084 40
(0.0089) (0.0121) (0.0108) (0.0217) [403]
Multiple −0.1128 ∗ ∗∗ −0.0571 −0.0571. −0.0391 10
(0.0326) (0.0346) (0.0309) (0.0314) [68]
Dependent variable
Level 0.0298 −0.0217 −0.0217 −0.0273 13
(0.026) (0.0295) (0.0263) (0.0835) [54]
Democracy
Polity −0.0003 0.0024 0.0024 −0.0132 80
(0.0088) (0.0200) (0.0178) (0.0178) [771]
Dichotomous −0.0169 0.0119 0.0119 0.0228 39
(0.0112) (0.0158) (0.0141) (0.0219) [361]
Other proxies 0.0003 −0.0125 −0.0125 0.0033 28
(0.0086) (0.0116) (0.0104) (0.0233) [323]
Control variables
Convergence 0.0341 ∗ ∗ 0.0198 0.0198 0.0288 152
(0.0128) (0.0197) (0.0176) (0.0326) [1748]
Investment 0.0018 −0.0570∗ −0.057∗ −0.0577 ∗ ∗ 120
(0.0104) (0.0285) (0.0255) (0.0206) [920]
Govern size 0.0185 0.0165 0.0165 0.0243 69
(0.0106) (0.0195) (0.0174) (0.0216) [550]
Human capital −0.0059 −0.0015 −0.0015 −0.0218 120
(0.0102) (0.0166) (0.0148) (0.0205) [991]
Corruption 0.0133 0.0307 0.0307 0.0341 20
(0.0354) (0.0244) (0.0218) (0.0345) [158]
Ethnicity 0.004 −0.0399 −0.0399. −0.0544∗ 18
Continued on next page
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
RE ML FE UWLS RE Studies
(s.e.) (clus. s.e.) (clus. s.e.) (clus. s.e.) [Eff. sizes]
(0.0165) (0.0236) (0.0211) (0.0256) [122]
Religion −0.0137 0.0311 0.0311 0.0776 7
(0.0233) (0.0335) (0.0299) (0.0549) [35]
Econ freedom −0.0199 −0.0352∗ −0.0352∗ −0.0264 26
(0.0177) (0.0170) (0.0152) (0.0346) [115]
Rule of law −0.0118 −0.0321 −0.0321 0.0153 26
(0.0216) (0.0290) (0.0258) (0.0298) [239]
State capacity 0.0637 ∗ ∗ 0.0395∗ 0.0395 ∗ ∗ 0.047 3
(0.0222) (0.0167) (0.0149) (0.0495) [31]
Openness −0.0043 0.0112 0.0112 0.0282 86
(0.0097) (0.0167) (0.0149) (0.0211) [902]
Population −0.0269∗ 0.0046 0.0046 −0.0125 79
(0.0108) (0.0175) (0.0156) (0.0203) [849]
World regions
Africa 0.2155 ∗ ∗∗ 0.1212 0.1212∗ 0.19∗ 161
(0.0148) (0.0634) (0.0566) (0.0823) [1773]
East Asia −0.0582 0.0752 0.0752 0.0435 150
(0.0446) (0.1069) (0.0954) (0.1023) [1657]
East Europe 0.0181 −0.0499 −0.0499 0.0311 125
(0.0191) (0.0540) (0.0482) (0.0364) [1388]
Latin America −0.0172 0.0254 0.0254 0.0601 152
(0.0199) (0.0366) (0.0327) (0.054) [1682]
Middle East 0.0449∗ 0.0807 0.0807 0.0340 155
(0.0187) (0.0672) (0.06) (0.0515) [1561]
South Asia −0.1258 ∗ ∗ −0.1503 −0.1503 −0.2527 ∗ ∗ 146
(0.0427) (0.1062) (0.0948) (0.0822) [1642]
High-income 0.0309 ∗ ∗ −0.0140 −0.014 0.0017 129
(0.0096) (0.0154) (0.0138) (0.0226) [1299]
Region dummies −0.0056 0.0065 0.0065 0.0189 33
(0.0104) (0.0086) (0.0077) (0.0205) [211]
Time periods
1940s 0.0434 −0.0792 −0.0792∗ −0.2258 3
(0.0337) (0.0439) (0.0392) (0.1471) [34]
1950s −0.002 0.0314∗ 0.0314 ∗ ∗ 0.0609 16
(0.0211) (0.0136) (0.0121) (0.0313) [106]
1960s −0.0751 ∗ ∗∗ −0.0337 −0.0337. −0.0430 95
(0.0148) (0.0210) (0.0188) (0.0254) [990]
1970s −0.0494 ∗ ∗∗ −0.0223 −0.0223 −0.0176 140
(0.0146) (0.0292) (0.0261) (0.0297) [1525]
1980s 0.0904 ∗ ∗∗ 0.0728∗ 0.0728∗ 0.0618 157
(0.0164) (0.0360) (0.0321) (0.0382) [1763]
1990s 0.0148 0.0254 0.0254 0.0184 108
(0.0187) (0.0252) (0.0224) (0.0280) [1458]
2000s −0.0386∗ −0.0098 −0.0098 −0.0225 70
Continued on next page
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
RE ML FE UWLS RE Studies
(s.e.) (clus. s.e.) (clus. s.e.) (clus. s.e.) [Eff. sizes]
(0.0189) (0.0189) (0.0169) (0.0300) [1019]
2010s 0.0003 0.0756∗ 0.0756∗ 0.0994∗ 22
(0.0397) (0.0380) (0.0339) (0.0392) [281]
Constant term −0.0928∗ −0.1264 −0.1264 −0.0853 188
(0.0374) (0.0906) (0.0809) (0.0754) [2047]
Notes: Standard errors in round parentheses as indicated in column headers. The sample
is composed by 2047 observations (188 studies). The dependent variable is the raw partial
correlation.
Significance levels *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05
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Table B.5: Meta-regression, main specifications only
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RE ML FE UWLS RE Studies
(s.e.) (clus. s.e.) (clus. s.e.) (clus. s.e.) [Eff. sizes]
Data Structure
Cross-section 0.0755∗ 0.0671 0.0671∗ 0.0718∗ 77
(0.0320) (0.0342) (0.0305) (0.0355) [460]
Time-series 0.1224 0.1451 0.1451 0.2704 11
(0.0762) (0.2234) (0.1995) (0.1679) [58]
Panel (avg) 0.0465 0.0324 0.0324 0.069∗ 56
(0.0324) (0.0203) (0.0182) (0.0288) [396]
Estimation techniques
FE −0.0004 −0.0146 −0.0146 −0.0628 61
(0.0213) (0.02) (0.0178) (0.0353) [357]
DPD 0.0549 −0.0428 −0.0428 −0.0844 16
(0.0343) (0.0341) (0.0304) (0.0558) [88]
Other techniques 0.0086 0.0309 0.0309 −0.0325 47
(0.0207) (0.0234) (0.0209) (0.0347) [265]
Non-linear specifications
Non-linearity −0.0675 ∗ ∗ −0.0288 −0.0288 −0.0926∗ 24
(0.0223) (0.0234) (0.0209) (0.0421) [120]
Interaction term −0.0325 −0.0013 −0.0013 −0.0305 36
(0.0180) (0.0114) (0.0102) (0.0314) [173]
Multiple Dem −0.1293 ∗ ∗ −0.0408 −0.0408 −0.0651 10
(0.0396) (0.026) (0.0232) (0.0384) [68]
Dependent variable
Level 0.0143 −0.0173 −0.0173 −0.0482 11
(0.0394) (0.0351) (0.0314) (0.0892) [37]
Democracy
Polity −0.008 −0.007 −0.007 −0.0213 73
(0.0151) (0.0179) (0.016) (0.0243) [446]
Dichotomous −0.0015 0.0085 0.0085 0.0334 33
(0.0216) (0.0177) (0.0158) (0.0272) [205]
Other proxies −0.0078 −0.012 −0.012 0.0141 22
(0.0223) (0.0152) (0.0136) (0.0327) [122]
Control variables
Convergence 0.0181 0.0001 0.0001 −0.001 146
(0.0208) (0.0152) (0.0136) (0.031) [1025]
Investment −0.0142 −0.0327 −0.0327 −0.0615∗ 110
(0.0173) (0.0195) (0.0174) (0.0263) [636]
Govern size 0.0098 0.0009 0.0009 0.0264 63
(0.0184) (0.0151) (0.0135) (0.023) [341]
Human capital −0.0087 −0.0022 −0.0022 −0.0243 110
(0.0194) (0.017) (0.0152) (0.0231) [722]
Corruption 0.0360 −0.0069 −0.0069 0.0274 19
(0.0404) (0.0292) (0.0261) (0.0462) [102]
Ethnicity 0.0168 −0.0297 −0.0297 −0.0379 16
Continued on next page
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
RE ML FE UWLS RE Studies
(s.e.) (clus. s.e.) (clus. s.e.) (clus. s.e.) [Eff. sizes]
(0.0254) (0.0209) (0.0187) (0.031) [65]
Religion 0.0010 0.0267 0.0267 0.1054 5
(0.0444) (0.0324) (0.0289) (0.0576) [21]
Econ freedom 0.0299 −0.0115 −0.0115 0.0153 22
(0.0337) (0.0219) (0.0196) (0.0296) [87]
Rule of law 0.0188 −0.0076 −0.0076 0.013 24
(0.0279) (0.0298) (0.0266) (0.0354) [139]
State capacity 0.0131 0.0399 0.0399 0.0316 3
(0.0418) (0.0247) (0.0221) (0.0852) [16]
Openness 0.0143 0.0067 0.0067 0.0512∗ 76
(0.0196) (0.0198) (0.0177) (0.0248) [489]
Population −0.0271 −0.0163 −0.0163 −0.0199 74
(0.0181) (0.0141) (0.0126) (0.0237) [497]
World regions
Africa 0.1595 ∗ ∗∗ 0.0462 0.0462 0.1372 153
(0.0214) (0.0293) (0.0262) (0.0717) [997]
East Asia 0.0093 0.0081 0.0081 0.0482 144
(0.0501) (0.0601) (0.0536) (0.0892) [947]
East Europe 0.0255 −0.0091 −0.0091 0.0267 120
(0.0246) (0.0186) (0.0166) (0.0339) [768]
Latin America 0.0167 −0.0052 −0.0052 0.0529 145
(0.027) (0.0254) (0.0227) (0.0511) [962]
Middle East 0.0131 0.0226 0.0226 0.0217 148
(0.0251) (0.0199) (0.0178) (0.0527) [907]
South Asia −0.1262 ∗ ∗ −0.0332 −0.0332 −0.2037∗ 141
(0.0461) (0.0616) (0.055) (0.0825) [926]
High-income 0.0215 −0.0122 −0.0122 0.0023 124
(0.0161) (0.0153) (0.0137) (0.0256) [710]
Region dummies −0.0225 0.0127 0.0127 0.0165 23
(0.027) (0.0162) (0.0145) (0.0261) [143]
Time periods
1940s 0.1734 −0.1681 −0.1681 −0.204 2
(0.0961) (0.1876) (0.1675) (0.1968) [16]
1950s 0.0346 0.0143 0.0143 0.0766∗ 15
(0.0367) (0.0156) (0.014) (0.0359) [78]
1960s −0.0400∗ −0.0158 −0.0158 −0.0384 89
(0.0201) (0.0176) (0.0157) (0.0255) [517]
1970s −0.0378 −0.0289 −0.0289 −0.0224 134
(0.0232) (0.0215) (0.0192) (0.0313) [906]
1980s 0.0852 ∗ ∗ 0.0613∗ 0.0613∗ 0.051 149
(0.0268) (0.0291) (0.026) (0.0394) [1012]
1990s 0.013 0.0149 0.0149 0.0204 101
(0.0229) (0.0227) (0.0202) (0.028) [756]
2000s −0.0606 0.0015 0.0015 −0.0181 67
Continued on next page
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
RE ML FE UWLS RE Studies
(s.e.) (clus. s.e.) (clus. s.e.) (clus. s.e.) [Eff. sizes]
(0.0334) (0.0192) (0.0171) (0.0317) [441]
2010s 0.0742 0.0458 0.0458∗ 0.1101∗ 22
(0.0442) (0.0239) (0.0214) (0.0452) [124]
Constant term −0.1189∗ −0.0123 −0.0123 −0.0396 180
(0.0516) (0.0518) (0.0463) (0.0657) [1227]
Notes: Standard errors in round parentheses as indicated in column headers. The sample
is composed by 1227 observations (180 studies). All models relating to robustness checks,
falsification tests, placebo or appendix have been omitted. Only the main specifications of
the studies are included in the sample.
Significance levels *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05
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Table B.6: Meta-regression, publication related issues
H-Index Institutions Published only
RE ML Studies RE ML Studies RE ML Studies
(s.e.) [Eff. sizes] (s.e.) [Eff. sizes] (s.e.) [Eff. sizes]
Publication
H-index 0.0001 176 0.0003 176
(0.0002) [1834] (0.0003) [1834]
US-UK institution 0.0711* 103
(0.0355) [1121]
Feedback 0.0318 31
(0.0599) [375]
US-UK inst. × H-Index -0.0007 103
(0.0005) [1121]
Data structure
Cross-section 0.0230 76 0.0256 76 0.0423 70
(0.0250) [533] (0.0249) [533] (0.0266) [563]
Time-series 0.1054 11 0.1351 11 -0.098 8
(0.0757) [100] (0.0762) [100] (0.0863) [51]
Panel (avg) 0.0308* 60 0.0303* 60 0.0338** 53
(0.0124) [640] (0.0124) [640] (0.0128) [554]
Estimation techniques
FE -0.0178 59 -0.0183 59 -0.033* 47
(0.0156) [640] (0.0156) [640] (0.0166) [472]
DPD 0.0063 20 0.0067 20 0.0124 18
(0.0200) [233] (0.0200) [233] (0.0206) [226]
Other techniques -0.0024 50 -0.0034 50 -0.0085 42
(0.0163) [351] (0.0163) [351] (0.0168) [293]
Non-linear specifications
Non-linearity -0.0925*** 23 -0.0926*** 23 -0.1111*** 18
(0.0182) [172] (0.0182) [172] (0.0217) [110]
Interaction -0.0106 40 -0.0101 40 -0.0126 34
(0.0101) [403] (0.0101) [403] (0.0106) [355]
Multiple -0.1098** 9 -0.1128** 9 -0.1725*** 7
(0.0348) [60] (0.0348) [60] (0.0403) [54]
Dependent variable
Level 0.0356 12 0.0362 12 0.1018* 6
(0.0287) [51] (0.0287) [51] (0.0463) [30]
Democracy
Polity 0.0035 75 0.0039 75 0.0037 63
(0.0105) [717] (0.0105) [717] (0.0108) [594]
Dichotomous -0.0144 35 -0.014 35 -0.0227 32
(0.0136) [307] (0.0136) [307] (0.0134) [325]
Other proxies 0.0014 24 0.0023 24 -0.0038 19
(0.0123) [268] (0.0123) [268] (0.0123) [168]
Control variables
Convergence 0.0300* 141 0.0293* 141 0.0227 126
(0.0139) [1538] (0.0139) [1538] (0.0148) [1406]
Continued on next page
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H-Index Institutions Published only
RE ML Studies RE ML Studies RE ML Studies
(s.e.) [Eff. sizes] (s.e.) [Eff. sizes] (s.e.) [Eff. sizes]
Investment 0.0141 114 0.0145 114 0.0037 101
(0.0127) [848] (0.0127) [848] (0.0136) [721]
Govern size 0.0092 66 0.0087 66 0.0066 58
(0.0121) [533] (0.0121) [533] (0.0124) [457]
Human capital -0.0107 114 -0.0107 114 -0.0079 101
(0.0114) [910] (0.0114) [910] (0.0126) [838]
Corruption 0.0136 19 0.0133 19 -0.0529 13
(0.0374) [155] (0.0375) [155] (0.0498) [112]
Ethnicity 0.0027 17 0.0015 17 -0.0103 14
(0.0186) [121] (0.0186) [121] (0.0197) [105]
Religion -0.0221 6 -0.0202 6 -0.0094 7
(0.0270) [22] (0.0270) [22] (0.0259) [35]
Econ freedom -0.0307 23 -0.0312 23 -0.006 22
(0.0200) [86] (0.0200) [86] (0.0204) [100]
Rule of law -0.0099 25 -0.0143 25 0.0123 20
(0.0228) [236] (0.0228) [236] (0.0268) [208]
State capacity 0.0633* 3 0.0627* 3 0.0966*** 2
(0.0247) [31] (0.0247) [31] (0.0257) [29]
Openness -0.0057 81 -0.0054 81 -0.0009 72
(0.0111) [792] (0.0111) [792] (0.0114) [630]
Population -0.0223. 72 -0.0207 72 -0.0154 65
(0.0130) [741] (0.0130) [741] (0.0132) [628]
World regions
Africa 0.1879*** 150 0.1872*** 150 0.2035*** 133
(0.0163) [1563] (0.0163) [1563] (0.0176) [1392]
East Asia -0.0341 139 -0.039 139 -0.0483 123
(0.0462) [1450] (0.0462) [1450] (0.0578) [1332]
East Europe 0.0171 114 0.0169 114 0.0386 100
(0.0217) [1223] (0.0216) [1223] (0.0244) [1074]
Latin America -0.0136 141 -0.0157 141 -0.0456 124
(0.0211) [1475] (0.0211) [1475] (0.026) [1340]
Middle East 0.0310 144 0.0325 144 0.0175 127
(0.0205) [1354] (0.0204) [1354] (0.0251) [1227]
South Asia -0.1219** 135 -0.1171** 135 -0.1264* 118
(0.0441) [1435] (0.0441) [1435] (0.0528) [1317]
High-income 0.0262* 118 0.0267* 118 0.026* 104
(0.0119) [1128] (0.0119) [1128] (0.0115) [980]
Region dummies -0.0053 31 -0.0056 31 -0.0128 28
(0.0117) [207] (0.0117) [207] (0.0136) [196]
Time periods
1940s 0.2177* 2 0.2082* 2 0.2741** 2
(0.0919) [28] (0.0917) [28] (0.0929) [28]
1950s 0.0140 15 0.0166 15 0.0176 13
(0.0262) [98] (0.0262) [98] (0.0284) [92]
Continued on next page
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H-Index Institutions Published only
RE ML Studies RE ML Studies RE ML Studies
(s.e.) [Eff. sizes] (s.e.) [Eff. sizes] (s.e.) [Eff. sizes]
1960s -0.0902*** 86 -0.0929*** 86 -0.08*** 78
(0.018) [831] (0.0180) [831] (0.0177) [680]
1970s -0.0374* 130 -0.0387* 130 -0.0304 116
(0.0158) [1321] (0.0158) [1321] (0.0168) [1162]
1980s 0.0891*** 146 0.0866*** 146 0.1122*** 128
(0.0177) [1553] (0.0177) [1553] (0.0182) [1362]
1990s 0.0244 99 0.0307 99 0.0095 83
(0.0231) [1305] (0.0232) [1305] (0.0225) [1069]
2000s -0.0886** 64 -0.0817** 64 -0.0627 52
(0.0309) [904] (0.0312) [904] (0.035) [741]
2010s 0.0273 20 0.0376 20 -0.0042 15
(0.0446) [203] (0.0446) [203] (0.0479) [83]
Constant term -0.0570 176 -0.1092* 176 -0.0435 153
(0.0443) [1834] (0.0496) [1834] (0.0440) [1612]
Notes: Random Effects (MultiLevel) MRA. Standard errors in round parentheses. H-Index: RePEc
H-Index (10 years) of the journal in which the study has been published; US-UK Institution: = 1 if
at least one of the author is affiliated to a US/UK/Canadian/Australia academic institution; Feedback:
= 1 if the authors acknowledged any feedback from other scholars that already published a study about
democracy and growth. The last column refers to a subsample of studies that exclude unpublished works.
Significance levels *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05
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Table B.7: Meta-regression, publication year
Full model No periods
RE ML RE ML Studies
(s.e.) (s.e.) [Eff. sizes]
Publication year −0.0028 −0.0013 188
(0.0020) (0.0017) [2047]
Data structure
Cross-section 0.0365 0.0290 81
(0.022) (0.021) [603]
Time-series 0.1205 0.1320 11
(0.0695) (0.0684) [100]
Panel (avg) 0.0300∗∗ 0.0287∗∗ 63
(0.0106) (0.0106) [663]
Estimation techniques
FE −0.0154 −0.0166 67
(0.0137) (0.0138) [777]
DPD 0.0055 0.0082 20
(0.0175) (0.0176) [233]
Other techniques −0.0010 −0.0045 54
(0.0144) (0.0143) [370]
Non-linear specifications
Non-linearity −0.0866∗∗∗ −0.0899∗∗∗ 25
(0.0163) (0.0164) [248]
Interaction −0.0113 −0.0103 40
(0.009) (0.0091) [403]
Multiple −0.1048∗∗∗ −0.1024∗∗ 10
(0.0313) (0.0315) [68]
Dependent variable
Level 0.0431 0.0255 13
(0.0258) (0.0253) [54]
Democracy
Polity 0.0017 −0.0004 80
(0.0086) (0.0087) [771]
Dichotomous −0.0163 −0.0182 39
(0.0109) (0.0107) [361]
Other proxies 0.0009 −0.0007 28
(0.0085) (0.0085) [323]
Control variables
Convergence 0.0302∗ 0.0283∗ 152
(0.0123) (0.0124) [1748]
Investment 0.0059 0.0055 120
(0.0109) (0.0108) [920]
Govern size 0.0112 0.0081 69
(0.0104) (0.0105) [550]
Human capital −0.0089 −0.01 120
(0.01) (0.0101) [991]
Corruption 0.0182 0.0512 20
Continued on next page
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Table B.7 – continued from previous page
Full model No periods
RE ML RE ML Studies
(s.e.) (s.e.) [Eff. sizes]
(0.0344) (0.0332) [158]
Ethnicity 0.0012 −0.0013 18
(0.0163) (0.0164) [122]
Religion −0.0141 −0.0131 7
(0.0229) (0.0229) [35]
Econ freedom −0.0187 −0.0044 26
(0.0172) (0.0171) [115]
Rule of law −0.0072 0.0107 26
(0.021) (0.0208) [239]
State capacity 0.0538∗ 0.0561∗∗ 3
(0.022) (0.0205) [31]
Openness −0.0074 −0.0074 86
(0.0096) (0.0096) [902]
Population −0.0226∗ −0.0167 79
(0.0105) (0.0104) [849]
World regions
Africa 0.1758∗∗∗ 0.1791∗∗∗ 161
(0.0148) (0.0149) [1773]
East Asia −0.033 −0.0370 150
(0.0432) (0.0431) [1657]
East Europe 0.0165 0.0171 125
(0.0187) (0.0188) [1388]
Latin America −0.0123 −0.0093 152
(0.0194) (0.0195) [1682]
Middle East 0.0300 0.0284 155
(0.0182) (0.0183) [1561]
South Asia −0.1084∗∗ −0.1059∗ 146
(0.0412) (0.0411) [1642]
High-income 0.0244∗∗ 0.0245∗∗ 129
(0.0094) (0.0095) [1299]
Region dummies −0.0057 −0.0048 33
(0.0102) (0.0103) [211]
Time dummies
1940s 0.035 −0.0013 3
(0.0331) [34]
1950s −0.0023 16
(0.0207) [106]
1960s −0.0623∗∗∗ 95
(0.0149) [990]
1970s −0.0442∗∗ 140
(0.0145) [1525]
1980s 0.0843∗∗∗ 157
(0.0164) [1763]
1990s 0.0207 108
Continued on next page
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Table B.7 – continued from previous page
Full model No periods
RE ML RE ML Studies
(s.e.) (s.e.) [Eff. sizes]
(0.0194) [1458]
2000s −0.0323 70
(0.0196) [1019]
2010s 0.0322 22
(0.0397) [281]
Constant term 5.5056 2.4532 188
(4.0311) (3.3723) [2047]
Notes: Random Effects (MultiLevel) MRA. Standard errors in
round parentheses as indicated in column headers. The sample
is composed by 2047 observations (188 studies). Both model spec-
ifications include the publication year of the study as a control
variable.
Significance levels *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05
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Table B.8: Meta-regression, full sample, effect of controlling for endogeneity
Col (1) Table 5 Endogeneity
RE ML RE ML Studies
(s.e.) (s.e.) [Eff. sizes]
Data structure
Cross-section 0.0413 0.0462∗ 81
(0.0217) (0.0208) [603]
Time-series 0.1168 0.125 11
(0.0697) (0.0694) [100]
Panel (avg) 0.0299 ∗ ∗ 0.0285 ∗ ∗ 63
(0.0106) (0.0105) [663]
Estimation techniques
FE −0.0171 67
(0.0137) [777]
DPD 0.0038 20
(0.0175) [233]
Other techniques −0.0027 54
(0.0143) [370]
Endogeneity 0.0166∗ 72
(0.007) [691]
Non-linear specifications
Non-linearity −0.0864 ∗ ∗∗ −0.0834 ∗ ∗∗ 25
(0.0163) (0.0162) [248]
Interaction −0.0120 −0.0132 40
(0.0090) (0.0089) [403]
Multiple −0.1061 ∗ ∗∗ −0.1041 ∗ ∗∗ 10
(0.0313) (0.031) [68]
Dependent variable
Level 0.0384 0.0372 13
(0.0255) (0.0254) [54]
Democracy
Polity 0.001 0.0006 80
(0.0086) (0.0086) [771]
Dichotomous −0.0156 −0.0152 39
(0.0109) (0.0109) [361]
Other proxies 0.0003 0.0005 28
(0.0084) (0.0084) [323]
Control variables
Convergence 0.0310∗ 0.0320 ∗ ∗ 152
(0.0123) (0.012) [1748]
Investment 0.0064 0.0063 120
(0.0109) (0.0108) [920]
Govern size 0.0114 0.0120 69
(0.0104) (0.0103) [550]
Human capital −0.0083 −0.0062 120
(0.0100) (0.0100) [991]
Corruption 0.0164 0.0162 20
Continued on next page
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Table B.8 – continued from previous page
Col (1) Table 5 Endogeneity
RE ML RE ML Studies
(s.e.) (s.e.) [Eff. sizes]
(0.0344) (0.0345) [158]
Ethnicity 0.0006 0.0103 18
(0.0163) (0.0145) [122]
Religion −0.0152 −0.0081 7
(0.0229) (0.0228) [35]
Econ freedom −0.0180 −0.0201 26
(0.0172) (0.0170) [115]
Rule of law −0.0066 −0.0060 26
(0.021) (0.0209) [239]
State capacity 0.0558∗ 0.0544∗ 3
(0.0220) (0.0219) [31]
Openness −0.0079 −0.0120 86
(0.0095) (0.0095) [902]
Population −0.0239∗ −0.0248∗ 79
(0.0104) (0.0102) [849]
World regions
Africa 0.1757 ∗ ∗∗ 0.1754 ∗ ∗∗ 161
(0.0148) (0.0148) [1773]
East Asia −0.0289 −0.0260 150
(0.0431) (0.0432) [1657]
East Europe 0.0148 0.0152 125
(0.0187) (0.0187) [1388]
Latin America −0.0120 −0.0115 152
(0.0193) (0.0193) [1682]
Middle East 0.0310 0.0308 155
(0.0182) (0.0182) [1561]
South Asia −0.1117 ∗ ∗ −0.1135 ∗ ∗ 146
(0.0412) (0.0413) [1642]
High-income 0.0241∗ 0.0248 ∗ ∗ 129
(0.0094) (0.0094) [1299]
Region dummies −0.0062 −0.0028 33
(0.0102) (0.0099) [211]
Time periods
1940s 0.0382 0.0386 3
(0.033) (0.0329) [34]
1950s −0.0050 −0.0073 16
(0.0206) (0.0206) [106]
1960s −0.0605 ∗ ∗∗ −0.0612 ∗ ∗∗ 95
(0.0148) (0.0148) [990]
1970s −0.0424 ∗ ∗ −0.0430 ∗ ∗ 140
(0.0144) (0.0144) [1525]
1980s 0.0863 ∗ ∗∗ 0.0856 ∗ ∗∗ 157
(0.0164) (0.0163) [1763]
1990s 0.0136 0.0124 108
Continued on next page
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Table B.8 – continued from previous page
Col (1) Table 5 Endogeneity
RE ML RE ML Studies
(s.e.) (s.e.) [Eff. sizes]
(0.0187) (0.0187) [1458]
2000s −0.0409∗ −0.0442∗ 70
(0.0185) (0.0182) [1019]
2010s 0.0170 0.0146 22
(0.0383) (0.0384) [281]
Constant term −0.0674 −0.0786∗ 188
(0.0366) (0.0353) [2047]
Notes: Random Effects (MultiLevel) MRA. Standard errors in round
parentheses. The sample is composed by 2047 observations (188 studies).
Endogeneity = 1 if the study account for potential endogeneity.
Significance levels *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05
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Table B.10: Meta-regression, excluding zero-order correlations
Col. (1) Tab. 5 Excl. 0 order corr.
RE ML Studies RE ML Studies
(s.e.) [Eff. sizes] (s.e.) [Eff. sizes]
Data structure
Cross-section 0.0413 81 0.0443* 78
(0.0217) [603] (0.0214) [598]
Time-series 0.1168 11 0.1178 11
(0.0697) [100] (0.0676) [100]
Panel (avg) 0.0299** 63 0.0305** 63
(0.0106) [663] (0.0105) [661]
Estimation techniques
FE -0.0171 67 -0.0144 67
(0.0137) [777] (0.0136) [777]
DPD 0.0038 20 0.0067 20
(0.0175) [233] (0.0174) [233]
Other techniques -0.0027 54 0.003 52
(0.0143) [370] (0.0144) [367]
Non-linear specifications
Non-linearity -0.0864*** 25 -0.086*** 25
(0.0163) [248] (0.0162) [248]
Interaction -0.0120 40 -0.0119 40
(0.0090) [403] (0.0089) [403]
Multiple -0.1061*** 10 -0.1042*** 10
(0.0313) [68] (0.031) [68]
Dependent variable
Level 0.0384 13 0.0257 11
(0.0255) [54] (0.0256) [51]
Democracy
Polity 0.001 80 0.0007 80
(0.0086) [771] (0.0086) [769]
Dichotomous -0.0156 39 -0.0154 39
(0.0109) [361] (0.0108) [361]
Other proxies 0.0003 28 -0.0006 27
(0.0084) [323] (0.0084) [320]
Control variables
Convergence 0.0310* 152 0.0302* 152
(0.0123) [1748] (0.0123) [1748]
Investment 0.0064 120 0.0052 120
(0.0109) [920] (0.0108) [919]
Govern size 0.0114 69 0.0117 69
Continued on next page
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Table B.10 – continued from previous page
Col. (1) Tab. 5 Excl. 0 order corr.
RE ML Studies RE ML Studies
(s.e.) [Eff. sizes] (s.e.) [Eff. sizes]
(0.0104) [550] (0.0103) [550]
Human capital -0.0083 120 -0.0078 120
(0.0100) [991] (0.0099) [991]
Corruption 0.0164 20 0.018 20
(0.0344) [158] (0.0339) [158]
Ethnicity 0.0006 18 0.0019 18
(0.0163) [122] (0.0162) [122]
Religion -0.0152 7 -0.0149 7
(0.0229) [35] (0.0227) [35]
Econ freedom -0.0180 26 -0.0177 26
(0.0172) [115] (0.017) [115]
Rule of law -0.0066 26 -0.005 26
(0.021) [239] (0.0208) [239]
State capacity 0.0558* 3 0.0562* 3
(0.0220) [31] (0.0218) [31]
Openness -0.0079 86 -0.0078 86
(0.0095) [902] (0.0095) [902]
Population -0.0239* 79 -0.0233* 79
(0.0104) [849] (0.0103) [849]
World regions
Africa 0.1757*** 161 0.1723*** 159
(0.0148) [1773] (0.0147) [1767]
East Asia -0.0289 150 -0.0247 148
(0.0431) [1657] (0.0424) [1653]
East Europe 0.0148 125 0.0189 122
(0.0187) [1388] (0.0185) [1384]
Latin America -0.0120 152 -0.0123 150
(0.0193) [1682] (0.0192) [1678]
Middle East 0.0310 155 0.0282 153
(0.0182) [1561] (0.0181) [1557]
South Asia -0.1117** 146 -0.1164** 144
(0.0412) [1642] (0.0405) [1638]
High-income 0.0241* 129 0.0227* 127
(0.0094) [1299] (0.0094) [1295]
Region dummies -0.0062 33 -0.0059 33
(0.0102) [211] (0.0101) [211]
Time periods
1940s 0.0382 3 0.0353 3
(0.033) [34] (0.0327) [34]
1950s -0.0050 16 -0.004 16
(0.0206) [106] (0.0204) [106]
1960s -0.0605*** 95 -0.0592*** 95
Continued on next page
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Table B.10 – continued from previous page
Col. (1) Tab. 5 Excl. 0 order corr.
RE ML Studies RE ML Studies
(s.e.) [Eff. sizes] (s.e.) [Eff. sizes]
(0.0148) [990] (0.0147) [987]
1970s -0.0424** 140 -0.0409** 140
(0.0144) [1525] (0.0144) [1522]
1980s 0.0863*** 157 0.0838*** 156
(0.0164) [1763] (0.0163) [1759]
1990s 0.0136 108 0.0154 108
(0.0187) [1458] (0.0185) [1456]
2000s -0.0409* 70 -0.0409* 68
(0.0185) [1019] (0.0184) [1014]
2010s 0.0170 22 0.0228 22
(0.0383) [281] (0.0373) [279]
Constant term -0.0674 188 -0.0696 185
(0.0366) [2047] (0.0363) [2040]
Notes: Random Effects (MultiLevel) MRA. Standard errors in round paren-
theses. The analysis excludes all models based on zero-order correlations
between democracy and growth. The sample is composed by 2040 observa-
tions (185 studies).
Significance levels *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05
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Table B.11: Meta-regression, excluding models with Level GDP as dependent variable
Col. (1) Tab. 5 Excluding Level ==1
RE ML Studies RE ML Studies
(s.e.) [Eff. sizes] (s.e.) [Eff. sizes]
Data structure
Cross-section 0.0413 81 0.0426 70
(0.0217) [603] (0.0233) [603]
Time-series 0.1168 11 0.1800* 8
(0.0697) [100] (0.0710) [100]
Panel (avg) 0.0299** 63 0.0313** 53
(0.0106) [663] (0.0106) [663]
Estimation techniques
FE -0.0171 67 -0.0160 47
(0.0137) [777] (0.0138) [777]
DPD 0.0038 20 0.0104 18
(0.0175) [233] (0.0175) [233]
Other est. tech. -0.0027 54 -0.0010 42
(0.0143) [370] (0.0147) [370]
Non-linear specifications
Non-linearity -0.0864*** 25 -0.0852*** 18
(0.0163) [248] (0.0163) [248]
Interaction -0.0120 40 -0.0112 34
(0.0090) [403] (0.0091) [403]
Multiple -0.1061*** 10 -0.1054*** 7
(0.0313) [68] (0.0311) [68]
Democracy
Polity 0.001 80 0.0007 63
(0.0086) [771] (0.0086) [771]
Dichotomous -0.0156 39 -0.0166 32
(0.0109) [361] (0.0109) [361]
Other 0.0003 28 -0.0004 19
(0.0084) [323] (0.0084) [323]
Control variables
Convergence 0.0310* 152 0.0309* 126
(0.0123) [1748] (0.0125) [1748]
Investment 0.0064 120 0.0061 101
(0.0109) [920] (0.0109) [920]
Govern size 0.0114 69 0.0123 58
(0.0104) [550] (0.0104) [550]
Human capital -0.0083 120 -0.0077 101
(0.0100) [991] (0.0100) [991]
Corruption 0.0164 20 0.0352 13
(0.0344) [158] (0.0345) [158]
Ethnicity 0.0006 18 -0.0016 14
(0.0163) [122] (0.0163) [122]
Religion -0.0152 7 -0.0132 7
(0.0229) [35] (0.0234) [35]
Continued on next page
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Table B.11 – continued from previous page
Col. (1) Tab. 5 Excluding Level ==1
RE ML Studies RE ML Studies
(s.e.) [Eff. sizes] (s.e.) [Eff. sizes]
Econ freedom -0.0180 26 -0.0193 22
(0.0172) [115] (0.0171) [115]
Rule of law -0.0066 26 -0.0056 20
(0.021) [239] (0.0209) [239]
State capacity 0.0558* 3 0.0651** 2
(0.0220) [31] (0.0219) [31]
Openness -0.0079 86 -0.0090 72
(0.0095) [902] (0.0096) [902]
Population -0.0239* 79 -0.0210* 65
(0.0104) [849] (0.0104) [849]
World regions
Africa 0.1757*** 161 0.1753*** 133
(0.0148) [1773] (0.0149) [1773]
East Asia -0.0289 150 -0.0274 123
(0.0431) [1657] (0.0427) [1657]
East Europe 0.0148 125 0.0085 100
(0.0187) [1388] (0.0188) [1388]
Latin America -0.0120 152 -0.0123 124
(0.0193) [1682] (0.0199) [1682]
Middle East 0.0310 155 0.046* 127
(0.0182) [1561] (0.0187) [1561]
South Asia -0.1117** 146 -0.1277** 118
(0.0412) [1642] (0.0406) [1642]
High-income 0.0241* 129 0.0228* 104
(0.0094) [1299] (0.0094) [1299]
Region dummies -0.0062 33 -0.0046 28
(0.0102) [211] (0.0102) [211]
Time periods
1940s 0.0382 3 0.0336 2
(0.033) [34] (0.0328) [34]
1950s -0.0050 16 -0.0016 13
(0.0206) [106] (0.0205) [106]
1960s -0.0605*** 95 -0.0549*** 78
(0.0148) [990] (0.0147) [990]
1970s -0.0424** 140 -0.0381** 116
(0.0144) [1525] (0.0144) [1525]
1980s 0.0863*** 157 0.1034*** 128
(0.0164) [1763] (0.0171) [1763]
1990s 0.0136 108 0.0069 83
(0.0187) [1458] (0.0189) [1458]
2000s -0.0409* 70 -0.0200 52
(0.0185) [1019] (0.0195) [1019]
2010s 0.0170 22 0.0118 15
(0.0383) [281] (0.0381) [281]
Continued on next page
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Table B.11 – continued from previous page
Col. (1) Tab. 5 Excluding Level ==1
RE ML Studies RE ML Studies
(s.e.) [Eff. sizes] (s.e.) [Eff. sizes]
Constant term -0.0674 188 -0.0949* 181
(0.0366) [2047] (0.0369) [1993]
Notes: Random Effects (MultiLevel) MRA. Standard errors in round paren-
theses. The sample is composed by 2047 observations (188 studies) for the
main model; 1993 observations (181 studies) for the model excluding Level
==1.
Significance levels *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05
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Appendix C. Further descriptives
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Table C.1: Democracy, human capital, and growth: t-statistics
Positive Negative Non-significant Total
Democracy
effect sizes 669 232 1146 2047
32.68% 11.33% 55.98%
study 45 19 124 188
23.94% 10.11% 65.96%
Human Capital
effect sizes 333 26 516 875
38.06% 2.97% 58.97%
study 38 2 71 111
34.23% 1.80% 63.96%
Democracy (Reduced)
effect sizes 180 144 440 764
23.56% 18.85% 57.59%
study 19 13 79 111
17.12% 11.71% 71.17%
Democracy (Main specifications)
effect sizes 367 150 710 1227
29.91% 12.22% 57.86%
study 44 19 117 180
24.44% 10.56% 65.00%
Democracy (Pre-DU)
effect sizes 172 111 458 741
23.21% 14.98% 61.81%
study 21 8 65 94
22.34% 8.51% 69.15%
Democracy (Post-DU)
effect sizes 497 121 688 1306
38.06% 9.26% 52.68%
study 24 11 59 94
25.53% 11.70% 62.77%
Notes: The significance level is p < 0.05. The Reduced sample contains only
estimates of democracy collected from a specification in which a proxy of human
capital was included. The pre-DU sample contains only estimates collected from
studies published before December 2005 - the date in which the search for studies
by Doucouliagos & Ulubas¸og˘lu (2008) ended. The post-DU sample contains
instead only estimates collected from studies published after December 2005. The
main specifications sample contains only estimates collected from specifications
included in the body of the article (i.e. appendixes are excluded) and not labelled
as robustness tests, sensitivity analyses or falsification and/or placebo strategies.
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Figure C.1: Democracy, human capital and economic growth: T-statistic distributions comparison
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Figure C.2: Democracy and economic growth: raw partial correlation and Fisher z-transformation
comparison
Partial correlation
D
en
si
ty
−1.5 −1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
0
1
2
3
4
Raw
Fisher's Z
101
